Appellants—plaintiffs in the court below— brought suit to enjoin defendants, members of the Fish and Game Commission, from enforcing against them the provisions of section 1110 of the Fish and Game Code of this state (Stats. 1939, p. CXXXIX; Initiative Measures approved Nov. 8, 1939), urging among other contentions that said section is violative of the state Constitution in that upon its submission to the voters it lacked the required legislative title. A general demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Plaintiffs electing to stand upon their pleading, declined to amend. Judgment for defendants was thereupon entered, from which the plaintiffs have taken this appeal.

Appellant Mezin is a resident of the State of Oregon; Cardinalli, of California. Both are fisherman-boat-owners operating under contracts to engage in fishing outside the territorial waters of California and deliver their catch, also out of such waters, to the “Lake Miraflores,” a floating fish reduction plant operated on the high seas by appellant Santa Cruz Oil Corporation, a California corporation with its principal place of business in this state. The fish so delivered to “Lake Miraflores” are there, more than three miles westerly from an imaginary line on the coast of California, reduced to fishmeal and oil, which is delivered through the port of San Francisco to various parts of the country. All of the vessels so used visit ports of this state in making deliveries, for the purpose of repairs, procuring supplies, etc.

Section 1110 of the Fish and Game Code provides in part: “No person shall use or operate or assist in using or operating in this State or the waters thereof, any boat or vessel used in connection with fishing operations irrespective of its home port or port of registration, which fishing boat or vessel delivers or by which there is delivered to any point or place other than within this State any fish, mollusks or crustaceans which are caught in, or taken aboard said boat or vessel from, the waters of the Pacific Ocean within this State or on the high seas or elsewhere, unless a permit authorizing the same shall have been issued by the Fish and Game Commission.” (Deering’s Gen. Laws, 1941 Supp., p.843.) Following a provision authorizing the commission, under specified circumstances, to grant permits, the section continues: “Any person who uses or operates or assists in using or operating any boat or vessel in violation of the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and such boat or vessel and the net, gear or other equipment of said boat or vessel is a public nuisance and shall be forfeited.” (Deering’s Gen. Laws, 1941 Supp., p. 843.) The manner of the forfeiture is provided by the code.

Appellants contend that “section 1110 is void for the reason that it was illegally submitted to the voters of California without the required legislative title contrary to the provisions of the California Constitution, article IV, section 24.” Section 24 provides that “Every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title. . . Section 1 of article IV, as adopted in 1911, provides that all initiative petitions described shall have printed in twelve point black-face type the following: “Initiative measure to be presented to the Legislature,” and that initiative or referendum petitions may be presented in sections, but that each section shall contain a full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed measure, and that “legislation may be enacted to facilitate its operation.”

Pursuant to the power granted, the Legislature in 1913 amended Political Code section 1197 and directed: “The attorney general shall provide and return to the secretary of state a ballot title or designation by which all such questions, propositions, proposed laws and constitutional amendments shall be designated upon the ballot; . . . The ballot title may be distinguished from the legislative or other title of the measure. ... In making such ballot title, the attorney general shall give a true and impartial statement of the pur pose of the measure. . . .” In 1915 section 1197a was added making it mandatory upon proponents of any initiative measure to submit a draft thereof to the attorney general so that a title might be prepared. In 1927 in Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585 [ 254 P. 946 , 62 A.L.R. 1341 ], the court considered the sufficiency of a title to a usury act, and in reference thereto stated (pp. 593, 595) : “We do not recognize an initiative measure as having any greater strength or dignity than attaches to any other legislation.... If an amendment of the constitution were intended, the provision requires steps to be taken that will apprise the voters thereof so that they may intelligently judge of the fitness of such measure as a constituent part of the organic law.” “It may be said in passing that section 1197a of the Political Code throws no light upon the question before us, as this act could not have been intended to dispense with this requirement as to title. We must, therefore, hold that the statute in question is subject to section 24 of article IV of the constitution, hereinbefore quoted, and that inasmuch as the provision here under consideration is an independent subject not referred to in the title to said act, so much of said act as comprises this provision is void. ’ ’ This case seems to recognize a difference in titles without use of the designation “legislative title” and “ballot title.” In 1932 the mandatory provisions of section 1197a were incorporated into section 1 of article IV of the Constitution.

The real question is: Are two titles needed, assuming them to be the same or different ? Our attention has not been called to any provision requiring more than one title on the ballot. Unless the legislative title has a tendency to deceive or mislead the legislators (Wallace v. Zinman , supra)—a matter that might well be disposed of before the matter appears on the ballot—all presumptions after election are in favor of the sufficiency of the original title. There is no claim made on this appeal that there was deception, but rather, that the title simply contained the enacting clause. In 1938 the Supreme Court rendered opinions in the cases of Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 61 [ 82 P.2d 445 ] ; Vandeleur v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 71 [ 82 P.2d 455 ], and Brown v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 75 [ 82 P.2d 450 ]. In the last case, referring to the previous cases, the court said (p. 78): “In those cases it was held that in passing upon the legal sufficiency of the circulation title prepared by the attorney general all presumptions are in favor of the propriety of his actions, and that if reasonable minds may differ as to whether the title contains a proper ‘summary of the chief purpose and points’ of the proposal, the title so prepared must be held to be legally sufficient. Auxiliary and subsidiary matters need not be included in the title.” (See, Hogan v. Hall, 198 Ark. 681 [ 130 S.W.2d 716 ]; Nordquist v. Ford, 112 Mont. 278 [ 114 P.2d 1071 ].) It was not necessary that the “legislative title” should appear on the ballot. (Vandeleur v. Jordan, supra.) There is no contention in this case that a legislative or ballot title entrapped the voters by being misleading or deceiving in character. (Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507 [ 289 P. 160 ].) Section 24 of article IV of the state Constitution “was not enacted to provide means for the overthrow of legitimate legislation.” (Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 62 [ 8 P.2d 467 ].

Appellants next urge that the Legislature has attempted to enact extraterritorial legislation; that the act constitutes an unlawful interference with interstate commerce; that it violates the privileges and immunities, equal protection of the laws and due process clauses of the federal Constitution.

It must be conceded that this statute presents a borderline case. It obviously affects extraterritorial operations over which this state has no jurisdiction. But it operates only on fishing boats that come within the territorial limits of this state. The lawful act of fishing outside the three mile limit obviously affects the natural resources of this state within the three mile limit. California has no power to extend the operation of its laws beyond its maritime frontier, but when the impact of activities outside the three mile limit necessarily adversely affects the public policy of this state, within the three mile limit, the state has the power to take steps against the persons responsible for such activities when they come within the limits of its jurisdiction. This statute does not make punishable acts committed outside the jurisdiction of California. It operates only when boats which fish outside its jurisdiction (but whose acts adversely affect the interests of this state) come within this state’s jurisdiction. As was said in Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 426 [ 56 S.Ct. 513 , 80 L.Ed. 772 ], in upholding a somewhat similar statute: “. . . its legal justification rests upon the ground that it operates as a shield against the covert depletion of the local supply, and thus tends to effectuate the policy of the law by rendering evasion of it less easy.” (See, also, Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 [ 29 S.Ct. 10 , 53 L. Ed. 75 ].)

The constitutional questions presented on this appeal are identical with those raised and discussed in Mirkovich v. Milnor, 34 F.Supp. 409 , wherein the plaintiff, engaged in a business similar to that of plaintiffs herein, sought to enjoin the same defendants, members of the Fish and Game Commission of the State of California, from enforcing against him the provisions of section 1110 of the Fish and Game Code of the State of California. The plaintiff in each action is represented by the same attorneys. The motion for a preliminary injunction in the Mirkovich case was denied by a federal court of three judges created by statute primarily to pass upon constitutional questions, the matter being “Before Healy, Circuit Judge and St. Sure and Welsh, District Judges.” The opinion was delivered by Welsh, District Judge. Such a decision is not controlling in this court, but the reasoning and the conclusion therein are persuasive and, as we find in the present case, sound. We therefore take the liberty of adopting as the opinion of this court the following language from the Mirkovich case:

While the authorities cited by appellants herein are not identical with those cited in the Mirkovich case, an examination of the former has not changed our view as to the correctness of the decision of the federal court.

The following citations submitted by respondents or the result of this court’s own research, tend to uphold the views expressed in the Mirkovich case: Johnson v. Gentry, 220 Cal. 231 [ 30 P.2d 400 ]; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 184 Cal. 26 [192 P.1021, 12 A.L.R. 1190 ]; In re Makings, 200 Cal. 474 [253 P.918]; Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal.2d 835 [ 118 P.2d 1 ]; Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture, 19 Cal.2d 818 [ 123 P.2d 442 ]; New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 [ 51 S.Ct. 519 , 75 L.Ed. 1176 ]; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 [ 47 S.Ct. 641 , 71 L.Ed. 1095 ]; 92 A.L.R. 1267 ; Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 [ 60 S.Ct. 758 , 84 L.Ed. 1074 ]; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 [ 55 S.Ct. 518 , 79 L.Ed. 1044 ].

The order sustaining the demurrer being non-appealable, the purported appeal therefrom is dismissed; the judgment is affirmed.

Peters, P. J., and Wagler, J. pro tern., concurred.