This is an appeal from the judgment in favor of the appellee, United States of America, entered by the District Court, and from an order of the District Court denying the motion of the appellant, Buck Witt, for rehearing.

The appellant sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346 (b), 2674 et seq., for damage to his property, certain mink, caused by the negligence of an employee of the United States flying an airplane over the appellant’s mink ranch.

This Court has jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291 and 1294.

The following agreed statement of facts appears in the pretrial order approved by counsel for the parties, and signed and entered by the District Judge:

From our examination of the transcript of testimony, it is our view that the following findings of fact made by the District Court relevant to the issues before us are supported by substantial evidence :

We have also reviewed the remarks of the District Judge made at the close of the arguments, which were incorporated by reference as part of the findings of fact. Included in such remarks are the following:

Likewise, we find such findings supported by substantial evidence.

Appellant’s specifications of error are:

The law is well settled that the standard of government liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act is, with respect to both military and civilian employees, that imposed by the respondeat superior doctrine of the place where the act or omission occurred. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 , 76 S.Ct. 100 , 100 L.Ed. 761 (1955); Chapin v. United States, 258 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 924 , 79 S.Ct. 607 , 3 L.Ed.2d 627 ; Sievers v. United States, 194 F.Supp. 608 (Dist. of Oregon, 1961).

Appellant does not contend that the findings of fact of the District Court are clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but his basic premise appears to be that Oregon law fastens vicarious liability in all cases and under all circumstances upon an employer if the employee, at the time of his negligent act, is doing something of benefit to or in furtherance of his employer’s business. From this basic premise, appellant postures the following.

(a) The aircraft was the property of appellee;

(b) Lt. Ballweber was authorized and directed to pilot the aircraft on a mission from Colorado to Yakima, Washington and return;

(c) That Lt. Wood was- a part of the authorized crew of said aircraft;

(d) That Lt. Ballweber had been authorized by appellee to give flight instruction to Lt. Wood-;

(e) That during the course of the day of May 8,1961 the aircraft under the control and direction of Lt. Ballweber made many “touch and go” flights on the Lenhardt airstrip, and that some of those flights were training flights for Lt. Wood; and

(f) That appellant suffered property damage proximately caused by some of the flights to and from the Lenhardt airstrip which occurred on May 8, 1961.

From the foregoing statement appellant reasons that the flight training received by Lt. Wood was of benefit to and in furtherance of the business of appellee and therefore concludes that under Oregon law appellee is liable for the damage sustained by appellant.

Simple justice might seem to requite that the public bear losses inflicted on innocent private citizens by Air Force officers, using Air Force equipment. However, from our examination of the Oregon authorities, we are compelled to agree with the District Court that if the present case were presented for decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon that Court would hold that the officers involved were not acting within the scope of their employment and that the appellee would not be liable for the damage caused by their negligent acts.

Appellant’s first error is in his appraisal of Oregon law. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Oregon do not support appellant’s basic premise that the sole test for determining whether an employee is acting within the scope of his employment is: Was the employee at the time of the commission of the negligent act doing something of benefit to, or in furtherance of, his employer’s business?

In support of his basic premise appellant rests his case on Dalrymple v. Covey Motor Car Co., 66 Or. 533 , 135 P. 91 , 48 L.R.A.,N.S., 424 (1913) and Tyler v. Moore, 111 Or. 499 , 226 P. 443 (1924). We have examined the opinions in those cases and while the decisions contain general language which might be construed to support appellant’s contention, such general language is in the nature of obiter when considered in light of the facts set forth in the opinions. While we do not agree that those opinions lay down the rule for which appellant contends, we are satisfied that if such be true that later opinions of the Supreme Court of Oregon contain many modifications and exceptions to such rule.

In several cases where it might be argued that there was some incidental benefit to the employer because of the employee’s conduct, the Supreme Court of Oregon has held the employee to be outside the scope of employment. In Hantke v. Harris Ice Machine Works, 152 Or. 564 , 54 P.2d 293 (1936), it was held that a servant was not within the scope of his employment while on his way to work. In Allum v. Ball, 168 Or. 577 , 124 P.2d 533 (1942), an employee who was on his way to get a chauffeur’s license in order that he could drive the employer’s lumber truck was held not to be in the scope of his employment. In Crosby v. Braley & Graham, 171 Or. 72 , 134 P.2d 110 (1943) the employee was on his way to the employer’s used car lot in order to lock one of the cars. The Court held that he was not within the scope of his employment. In Jasper v. Wells, 173 Or. 114 , 144 P.2d 505 (1943), it was held that the journey of the employee was outside of his employment although one of the purposes of the journey taken by the employee was to hire somebody to come to work for the employer.

In other cases the Supreme Court of Oregon has held that various types of deviation by employees from the scope of their employment, such as deviations as to time, place and purpose, operate to take the employee out of the scope of his employment. Jasper v. Wells, supra; Barry v. Oregon Trunk Railway, 197 Or. 246 , 253 P.2d 260 (1953) ; Larkins v. Utah Copper Co., 169 Or. 499 , 127 P.2d 354 (1942); Summerville v. Gillespie, 181 Or. 144 , 179 P.2d 719 (1947).

In the instant case the District Court found two types of deviation by Lt. Ballweber from the scope of his employment; the first deviation being geographic, and the second deviation being an abandonment by Lt. Ballweber of the mission commanded by the appellee. In finding of fact 3, supra, the flight order issued by appellee directed a flight from Colorado to Yakima, Washington for the purpose of delivering certain cargo to Yakima, Washington and directed a return to Colorado on completion of the mission at Yakima. There appears no finding that the mission included the giving of flight instruction to Lt. Wood at any airstrip in Oregon.

In finding of fact 4, supra, the District Court found that upon completion of the mission at Yakima, the crew did not return to Colorado but flew in a southwesterly direction from Yakima a distance of approximately three hundred miles to Florence, Oregon; that enroute the crew of the aircraft stopped at the Lenhardt airstrip approximately one hundred eighty miles southwest of Yakima; that on their return from Florence the crew again stopped at the Lenhardt airstrip; and the following day “made flights to other cities in that area and during the course of the day made many ‘touch and go’ flights on said airstrip, some of these flights being training flights for Wood and others being for the entertainment of non-military personnel.”

In finding of fact 7, supra, the Court found that the crew in making flights from the Lenhardt airstrip “were not acting in the line of duty of their employment with defendant” but “were acting outside the course and scope of their employment with the Department of the Army”; that the deviation made by the crew “was entirely outside and beyond the proper construction of the authority granted by the order dated May 5, 1961”; “that the crew of said aircraft were on a ‘lark’ of their own at the time of committing the negligent acts as aforesaid”; and that any flight plan into Oregon was unknown to appellee, and existed solely for the purpose of deviating from orders and to enable the crew to visit the parents of two members of the crew.

It is to be borne in mind that the findings of the District Court are fully supported by the evidence, and in several instances represent resolutions made by the trier of fact on conflicting evidence. Under such circumstances, the question whether an employee acts within the course of his employment and whether there has been a deviation from the employer’s business is ordinarily a factual issue for the trier of facts. Larkins v. Utah Copper Co., supra; Barry v. Oregon Trunk Railway, supra.

It has been settled law in Oregon for many years that an employer is shielded from liability when an employee steps outside the scope of his employment and commits an act to serve his own interest or to gratify his own desires. French v. Cresswell, 13 Or. 418 , 11 P. 62 (1886).

We have examined our decision in Murphey v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950) and find appellant’s reliance upon that case misplaced.

Appellant’s second error is his unwarranted assumption, contrary to the find ing of the District Court, that Lt. Ballweber was acting within the course and scope of his employment in giving flight instruction to Lt. Wood at the Lenhardt airstrip.

We now consider appellant’s specification that “the trial court erred in failing to hold that the defendant-appellee ratified the conduct of pilots Ballweber and Wood.”

Appellant predicates ratification primarily on the grounds that the appellee paid the expenses of the crew for gasoline, etc., on the trip and failed to take disciplinary action against Lt. Ballweber.

In the remarks of the District Court, made at the close of arguments, which were incorporated by reference as a part of the findings of fact, the District Court stated:

An examination of the record reflects that Ballweber gave his superior officers a false account for failure of the crew to return directly from Yakima; that he did not report where the landings on May 8, 1961 were made; that the flights on May 7th and 8th were not logged in his report; and that the deviations on May 7th and 8th were concealed from superior officers.

We are fully satisfied that the District Judge properly concluded under Oregon law that appellant failed to establish ratification by appellee of the unauthorized conduct on the part of Lt. Ballweber. In Summerville v. Gillespie, supra, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated, at page 153 of the Oregon reports, 179 P.2d at page 723 : “The doctrine of ratification has as its foundation, knowledge of all the facts.” In Tauscher v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 153 Or. 152 , 56 P.2d 318 (1936), the Supreme Court stated, at page 164 of the Oregon reports, at page 323 of 56 P.2d that “[t]here must be knowledge of the tortious act of the servant and an intention on the part of the master to ratify it.”

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

. “§ 1346. United States as defendant. # * * % * “(b) * * * ^he district courts * * * shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” “Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 : “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, * *