This cause was transferred to this court after decision by the District Court of Appeal of the Fourth District that we might give further consideration to the question raised by petitioners that they were placed in jeopardy at the first trial of said action when the jury impaneled and sworn to try the case against petitioners was dismissed without their consent and over their protest. The authorities are in unison that jeopardy attaches to a defendant when he is placed on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid indictment or information before a jury duly impaneled and charged with his deliverance. At just what stage in the proceedings in a criminal action is the jury “charged with the deliverance” of the defendant on trial? Respondents contend that until the information is read to the jury and the plea of the defendant is stated, the jury is not charged with his deliverance. At the first trial of petitioners the jury was impaneled and sworn but before the indictment was read or the plea stated to the jury the prosecution moved the court to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury. As we have seen, the court granted this motion against the protest of the defendant. This question as to when jeopardy attaches to a defendant placed on trial in a criminal action is settled in so far as the courts of this state have spoken by the authorities cited in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal hereinafter set forth. These authorities hold that a jury stands charged with the deliverance of a defendant when its members have been impaneled and sworn. Respondents cite cases from other jurisdictions to the contrary, but they are not controlling in the face of the decisions of our own courts.

We are also in agreement with the District Court of Appeal in its holding that prohibition is available to petitioners to restrain the further trial of said action. The present action cannot in our opinion be distinguished from the case of Huntington v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 288 [ 90 Pac. 141 ]. That case was followed and approved' in Oliver v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 94, 97 [ 267 Pac. 764 ]. The rule announced therein must be deemed to be the settled law of this state. We find ourselves therefore in complete accord with the opinion and decision of the District Court of Appeal rendered in this action and written by Mr. Justice Marks, and we adopt said opinion as the opinion of this court. The opinion of the District Court of Appeal is as follows:

“At this stage in the proceedings the following occurred:

“Former jeopardy is thus defined in 8 Ruling Case Law, page 138:

‘ ‘ In People v. Hawkins, supra, it was said:

“The case of People v. Young, supra, is so factually similar to the instant ease that it must be considered as controlling here. In that case a jury with two alternates were sworn. The district attorney made his opening statement to the jury. A juror reported that he was acquainted with a witness who was to be called for defendant. Over the objection of defendant the district attorney was permitted to exercise a peremptory challenge on this juror and one of the alternates was drawn and entered the jury box. Defendant was refused leave to enter the plea of former jeopardy. He was convicted and in reversing the judgment and ordering his discharge the court said:

It is ordered that the demurrer to the amended petition be overruled and that the writ of prohibition be issued as prayed for.

Langdon, J., Edmonds, J., Shenk, J., Waste, C. J., Houser, J., and Seawell, J., concurred.