This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of respondents in an action for the removal of three deep well centrifugal pumps from a ranch property during the period of redemption in a mortgage foreclosure action. The trial court found that the pumps had not become affixed to the real property so as to pass title to the appellant, who was the mortgagee and also the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. The sole question to be decided upon this appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that the pumps in question were not fixtures.

On October 14, 1928, Horace R. Moses and wife, the in interest of respondents Long, borrowed $21,500 from appellant and executed a mortgage securing said sum on 215 acres of land near Perris, in Riverside County. An action to foreclose said mortgage was commenced on October 8, 1935, and on June 1, 1936, a commissioner’s certificate of sale of the mortgaged property was issued to appellant. No redemption occurring, a commissioner’s deed was issued on July 31, 1937.

In order to understand the factual background, it is necessary to set forth a few facts in addition to those set forth in the findings hereinafter set forth. Respondents Long acquired an interest in said ranch in 1920, and became the sole owners in 1931. The ranch was used for growing alfalfa and the irrigation water was pumped from deep wells. At the time of the execution of the mortgage there were two wells on the property equipped with pumps, one of which was replaced in 1929 by one of the pumps herein involved. A third well was drilled in 1930 and equipped with a Johnston turbine pump. All of the pumps here involved were purchased on conditional sales contracts but were fully paid for in 1930 or prior thereto.

The trial court found that said land was in a semi-arid region and required irrigation in order to be farmed and that the only practicable means of obtaining irrigation for said land is by drilling wells and the installation of adequate pumping machinery and equipment; that said land had for more than 15 years been used .chiefly for growing alfalfa and had been graded and leveled and equipped with concrete pipe lines, two-thirds of said land having been so prepared prior to the execution of the mortgage and onethird thereafter, and that the water for the irrigation of said land was obtained from wells which had been drilled thereon.

The findings of the court then proceed:

It appears from the record without contradiction that there were three reservoirs on the land into which the water pumped from the wells could be pumped, and that the concrete pipe lines were interconnected and attached to and could be used with each of the pumps, and that after the water left the pumps it went into a concrete weir box which was imbedded in the soil and connected to the pipe lines by a Dayton coupling which joined the pipe to the pump, and the pipe to the weir box. The findings and the photograph of said Dayton coupling, introduced as an exhibit, shows said connection to be a substantial and firm connection between the pump and the remainder of the irrigation system. The respondent Bank of Perris removed the pumps from the property on March 1, 1937, after having received a chattel mortgage on the pumps and a bill of sale thereof from the respondent Long. In order to remove said pumps it was necessary to remove the roof and part of the sides of each pump house and to lift the pump out with a block and tackle.

A witness called by respondents explained how he had installed all three of the pumps as follows:

Section 657 of the Civil Code defines property to be either: “1. Real or immovable; or 2. Personal or movable.”

Real or movable property consists of: “1. Land; 2. That which is affixed to land; 3. That which is incidental or appurtenant to land; 4. That which is immovable by law ...” (Civ. Code, § 658.)

Personal property is defined as “Every kind of property that is not real. ...” (Civ. Code, § 663.)

The law relating to fixtures recognizes that under certain circumstances personal property becomes a part and parcel of real property and thereafter assumes the status of real property. Section 660 of the Civil Code reads as follows:

With reference to section 660 of the Civil Code our Supreme Court has stated: “This section of the code is simply a rule for general guidance, concerning itself more with the ultimate than with probative facts.” (Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 Pac. 19 ].) The relationship between the parties to the controversy must be taken into consideration in whether an article of personal property has become affixed to the real property. Personal property which would assume the status of real property, if affixed thereto by the owner or mortgagor, would not assume the status of real property if affixed thereto by a tenant. This rule is clearly stated by our Supreme Court in the case of R. Barcroft & Sons Co. v. Cullen, 217 Cal. 708 [ 20 P. (2d) 665 ], where it is said (pp. 711-712):

In the same case the court said:

In the case of San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. San Diego County, 16 Cal. (2d) 142 [ 105 P. (2d) 94 , 133 A. L. R. 416], a very recent case on the question of fixtures, decided since the judgment in the instant case was entered, the court stated the test to be applied as follows:

In the case of Southern California Telephone Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 12 Cal. (2d) 127 [ 82 P. (2d) 422 ], the court stated, at p. 134:

In the case of M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal. (2d) 31 [ 63 P. (2d) 818 ], it is ¡sfaid at pages 37 and 38:

In the case of Broadway Improvement & Investment Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Cal. (2d) 465 [ 41 P. (2d) 553 ], the trial court found that the gas steam radiators in an apartment house were not attached to the floors except that each radiator was connected by means of a “ slip j oint threaded union and flange ’ ’ to a gas pipe in each room and the lobby, and could not be removed except by unscrewing it with a wrench, and held that said radiators were not fixtures. Upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment upon that phase of the case, saying on page 469 of the opinion:

In 26 Corpus Juris, p. 661, § 10, it is stated:

Applying the legal principles hereinbefore set forth to the facts of the instant case, as shown by the findings and the undisputed evidence, we believe that the trial court erred in holding that the three pumps involved in this action were not fixtures.

As we view the matter there can be no doubt that it was the intention of respondents Long to make said pumps a permanent part of said irrigation system and said alfalfa ranch. This is clearly shown by the manner of their installation— (1) the placing of each pump-head upon a concrete foundation imbedded in the ground, which foundation was, according to the findings of the court, “constructed for the particular purpose of providing a firm, steady, and accurate resting place for the pump and sustaining its entire weight of approximately 5990 pounds”; (2) the cement or cement grouting filled in and around the pump-head where it rested upon the concrete block; (3) the joining together of the pipe from the pump-head to the pipe extending from the weir box by a Dayton coupling consisting of certain pieces of steel joined together by bolts, the weir box being a large concrete box from the bottom of which concrete pipe lines run out through various parts of the ranch, these pipes being used to carry water from the weir boxes to one or more of the reservoirs or to irrigate the alfalfa directly from the pipe lines; (4) the enclosing of each pump in a specially constructed pump-house from which it could only be taken by removing part of the sides and the roof; (5) and the fact that it at once became and was an integral part of an interconnected irrigation system without which the alfalfa ranch could not be operated. There is not a word of testimony from respondents Long or anyone else that there was any other intention.

As was said in 11 R. O. L., p. 1062, § 6:

Furthermore, the manner of the installation of the pumps and the manner in which they were used, as hereinbefore set forth, clearly shows that they meet the test of fixtures as to annexation and adaptability, as required by the authorities hereinbefore referred to.

Respondents seek to avoid the force of the authorities cited by arguing that the pumps were purchased under conditional sales contracts, and that when installed they had on each of them a plate which stated that the “title to this machinery is vested in the Johnston Pump Co. until fully paid for in money, and under the sales contracts thereon the said machinery cannot nor shall it become a part of the real estate or property wherever it is located. ’ ’ Respondents argue that such clauses in the conditional sales contracts and on the plates on the pumps, show that it was not the intention of the pump company nor of respondents Long that said pumps be affixed to the land. In the instant case all three pumps were paid for within a short time after they were installed and seven years before they were removed by the respondent bank.

It is true that by such a reservation a conditional sales vendor would have the right to remove the pumps if the purchase price were not paid, and that the authorities recognize such right. But the general rule is, as stated in 26 Corpus Juris, p. 678, § 39:

In the leading case of Planters’ Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 132 S. C. 16 [ 128 S. E. 876 , 41 A. L. R. 592], the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in stating the general rule, said:

Bespondents point to the fact that the pumps were on one occasion for the purpose of being overhauled and then put back in place, the manner of removal being by substantially the same means as when the pumps were removed by respondent bank, and respondents contend that this is some evidence that the installation of the pumps was not intended to be permanent.

This contention is fully answered by the following language from the case of San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. San Diego, supra:

Other points discussed in the briefs do not in our opinion require discussion.

It follows from the foregoing that the trial court erred in holding that the three pumps in controversy were not fixtures.

Under the allegations of the complaint and those findings supported by the evidence it does not seem possible for plaintiff to recover judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Long. If there was a conversion of the property it was by the bank and not by the individual defendants.

The portion of the judgment in favor of Leon G. Long, also known as Leon C. Long, and Louise Davis Long is affirmed. The portion of the judgment in favor of Bank of Perris is reversed.

Barnard, P. J., and Marks, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied June 10, 1942, and respondent Bank of Perris’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 6, 1942.