This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s petition for a family allowance. The admitted facts are as follows:

Appellant and Thomas E. McCoy, now deceased, were husband and wife. They had no children. Appellant had procured an interlocutory decree of divorce under a complaint charging him with extreme cruelty. Prior to the rendition of said decree appellant and deceased executed a property settlement agreement the terms of which, so far as material here, are as follows:

During the interlocutory period appellant’s husband died.

Appellant expects to receive about $6,000 from a policy of insurance on the decedent’s life. By the property settlement agreement decedent had a right to change the beneficiary of this policy which he did not do. When appellant and decedent were living together he earned approximately $200 a month, all of which was consumed in living expenses. Since her husband’s death appellant worked two weeks, found it too strenuous, and had to stop. Appellant has no separate income.

The right to a family allowance is covered by section 680 of the Probate Code, which is based on the former section 1466 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and which reads as follows:

The sole question presented on this appeal is whether appellant waived her right to ask for a family allowance by reason of the above-quoted provisions of the property settlement agreement. It is not disputed that the wife may, by her agreement, waive such right. It is well established, however, that in order to bar a family allowance the intention to waive the right must be clear and explicit, and that any uncertainty in the language of the agreement will be resolved in favor of the right. (Estate of Whitney, 171 Cal. 750 [ 154 Pac. 855 ]; Estate of Gould, 181 Cal. 11 [ 183 Pac. 146 ]; Estate of Bidigare, 215 Cal. 28 [ 8 P. (2d) 122 ].)

Appellant contends that she did not waive her right to a family allowance by said agreement and cites Estate of Bidigare, supra, as being a case in which “almost the identical situation was considered by the Supreme Court.” In that ease the property settlement agreement was signed on February 11, 1930, the wife was granted an interlocutory decree on February 18,1930, and the husband died on April 21, 1930. The widow filed a petition for a family allowance and the appeal was from the court’s order granting the same. The property settlement agreement involved in the cited case read as follows:

In affirming the judgment the court said at page 30:

Appellant also cites Estate of Shapero, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 144 [ 102 P. (2d) 569 ], In that case decedent and respondent entered into an antenuptial agreement by the terms of which it was agreed that “as an integral part hereof, and in consideration of all mutual covenants contained herein, that both parties hereby release each other, waive and relinquish all rights, interest or claims against the other for any alimony, attorney’s fees or costs in connection with any possible litigation there may be between them and arising out of, or in connection with their domestic relations, or otherwise, which may happen between them at any time during their married life, including also all rights of inheriting, administration, homestead or otherwise, whatever ...” After the death of the husband the widow petitioned for a family allowance and the appeal was from the order granting such family allowance, the contention of appellant being that the widow by the terms of the antenuptial agreement had waived her right to a family allowance. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the order and a hearing was denied by the Supreme Court.

In Estate of Yoell, 164 Cal. 540 [ 129 Pac. 999 ], the property settlement agreement contained the following language:

The Supreme Court in passing upon the question as to whether the widow had waived her right to a family allowance said:

It will be noted that the question of whether or not the right to a family allowance has been waived by an antenuptial or postnuptial property settlement agreement is a matter of construction and interpretation. General statements contained in decisions cannot always be taken at their face value but must be considered in connection with the language used in the contract construed in the opinion. The provisions of each agreement must-be examined critically, as the question of waiver or nonwaiver depends sometimes on a slight difference in phraseology. And, as was stated in Estate of Whitney, supra:

Applying the rules hereinbefore set forth to the particular contract involved in the instant case, we believe it must be held that appellant, in and by said agreement, intended to and did waive her right to a family allowance. The language used in the contract under consideration is far more inclusive than the language used in any of the cases in which it was held that the right to a family allowance was not waived. It is clear from the agreement that appellant and deceased intended to settle all present and future rights as against each other and against their respective estates. Each party in said agreement waived all right to administer the estate of the other and all claim to inherit any part of the estate of the other; and each party discharged the other from all liability for maintenance of the other; and, finally, both parties agreed that said agreement “constitutes a full and complete settlement between the parties of all of their property rights, and of all claims of either party arising out of the marital relation of the parties." (Italics ours.)

We conclude, therefore, that taking the agreement as a whole, and applying to it the elementary rules of construction, appellant in and by said agreement waived her right to a family allowance, and that the trial court did not err in denying her petition therefor.

The order denying appellant’k petition for a family allowance is affirmed.

Barnard, P. J., and Marks, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 25,1942.