Hamilton was inducted into the army on July 29, 1963, by appellee. He wants out. He complains of the procedures used and the rulings of his draft (selective service) board. In his last year before induction, he was asserting the condition of his mother as a reason for a dependency exemption or deferment.

At about the hour of Hamilton’s induction, his attorney filed in a United States district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The validity of the induction was tried before the district court and all relief denied. On this, appeal, we affirm the order of the district court.

As is normal in such a case, there is a thick file from the selective service board. We detail some of the chronology we find there.

Hamilton was 18 years old on October 17, 1955, and a few days thereafter registered with Local Board No. 30, Richmond, California. It would appear that his status as a college student kept the army away from his door until some time in 1960 or 1961. For about two years in 1960-1962 he did not get inducted chiefly because of injuries in an automobile accident which lingered on. His father died January 21, 1961, leaving his wife, Barbara, and son Allen, the appellant here, surviving. On July 22. 1961, Allen married Stephanie Abbott. By this time, he had taken a job as a salesman with a Los Angeles jewelry-firm. He started at a small salary while his wife continued to work in a San Francisco store.

By October, 1962, Hamilton and his wife, Stephanie, had moved to Los Angeles, he was prospering as a salesman, and she had apparently ceased to work for an employer. After his marriage, he began to press the board with the point that his mother was suffering from Parkinson’s disease and was dependent upon him. We think the following chronology is important:

1. On an information questionnaire dated September 15, 1961, submitted by Hamilton, but not filed until October 10, 1961, he said nothing of his mother’s dependency.

2. On October 18, 1961, Hamilton sent the board a “notice of change” reporting, inter alia, as a change in dependency status, the following: “[EJntire support of my mother — not able to support herself as she has Parkinson’s disease.” He also reported the father’s death on January 21, 1961.

3. On March 25, 1962, he filled out a dependency report which was filed March 30, 1962, in which he reported that he was giving support to his mother in the amount of $75.00 per month. He also said in a statement approved and signed by his mother, “I contribute her entire monthly income with the exception of a small amount that my father left her. He died January, 1961 — my mother has a nervous disease called Parkinson’s disease — she is physically unable to work which necessitates me supporting her— $75.00 per month. She owns her home. We keep in close contact as I am an only child.”

4. On January 11, 1963, a San Jose lawyer wrote the draft board that Hamilton had been appointed by a California state court as conservator of his mother’s estate. The lawyer also expressed fears that the mother’s new husband might squander her small estate and said that the husband was doing nothing to support her.

5. On January 19, 1963, he filled out a new dependency questionnaire in which he said:

6. On February 27, 1963, he wrote the board:

7. About March 3, 1963, he wrote to the board that the board should have copies of the conservatorship proceedings. (The board responded by asking for details of the conservatorship, the value of the estate.)

8. On April 9, 1963, the board received from Hamilton a copy of his letters of conservatorship and the estate inventory. The inventory showed a house worth $15,000, cash in the amount of $1,944.77 and personal property worth $500.00.

9. On April 24, 1963, he sent the doctor’s report on his mother to the board. The text of the report is as follows:

Hamilton carried the classification of I-A (eligible now) most of the time until May 17, 1962, when he was classified I-Y. We take it that this latter classification, “not meeting current standards,” grew out of his physical examination, because he had shortly before been advised to report in six months for another physical examination. (He had been injured in an automobile accident, as above noted.)

The last classification came on February 6, 1963, when he was classified I-A— notice went out that day of the classification. At this time the board exercised its discretion on Hamilton’s claim of dependency. On February 25, a notice to report for induction on March 14 was sent from the board.

On February 27, 1963, Hamilton requested a hearing, he having received the notice of induction. On February 28, he wrote a more complete letter saying, because he was traveling, he did not get his notice of classification until February 25, 1963.

The regulations allowing a personal hearing if request is made within ten days after classification do not permit an extension because of failure to have one’s mail promptly attended to and forwarded. Further, after the order for induction was mailed, there would ordinarily be no right to be heard.

But in our view the board did subsequently cancel its order to report by its postponement on March 6, 1963, “until further notice” of induction. Thus, after March 6, he was entitled to submit any proof of change of circumstance since his last classification of February 6,1963. But the trouble is that the material submitted after February 6, 1963, just does not show any change for the worse after that date. , Neither does it indicate the condition of the mother on February 6, 1963, was any worse than he had previously described it. We assume the board had a duty to examine whatever Hamilton sent in as papers. The record indicates the board did. They found no new change in circumstances requiring a reopening. As a matter of fact, the doctor’s letter shows that the mother was seriously suffering from Parkinson’s disease when Hamilton was classified I-A in November, 1958.

The board could take notice that Hamilton was not physically caring for his mother and was not required to assume that the son would be displaced as the conservator by a California court. Our examination of the California statutes leads us to believe that a conservator temporarily absent in the army would not be removed as conservator. And, we cannot assume that a California court would appoint a conservator of the type that Hamilton’s lawyers paint the stepfather to be.

We cannot agree that the forwarding of the file to the appeal board in law had constituted the local board’s further consideration of the claim of dependency after he was classified I-A on February 6, 1963, an actual reopening. For ex ample, the appeal board might have determined Hamilton was entitled to a further hearing before the local draft board. But it did not. We do not say it should have. Further, it would appear that the appeal board did consider the appeal on the classification of February 6, 1963, on its merits.

Under the circumstances, Hamilton has been treated fairly by his government.

It is all important in Vineelli, supra, that after he presented his material on a claim for IV-D classification, he never had a chance to appear before the board. There reconsideration was asked on a new ground. Hamilton had reconsideration, including a chance for personal appearance, if he had made the provisions for policing his own mail that the law required. It is much easier to hold there was a reconsideration on a new ground, as in Vineelli, than it is to say that there was or should have been a rereconsideration of the properly reconsidered new ground in Hamilton.

The parties are in agreement that the Secretary of Defense is not a proper party. As to him, the case is dismissed.

The order denying habeas corpus is affirmed.

. On September 10, 1963, the President of the United States exempted married men from the draft, too late to help tbe appellant. 28 FR 9865 . . “In Class I-Y shall be placed any registrant who would have been classified in Class I-A or Class I-A-0 as being currently available for service in the armed forces but for the fact that he has been found to be physically, mentally and morally qualified for such service only in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress.” 32 CFR 1622.17. . 32 CFR § 1624.1 (a) (b). . The words of Hamilton’s excuse were: “My job requires that I travel an extensive territory which takes me away from home for long periods of time. I was out of town and I did not see my mail which included notice of draft classification until Monday, February 25.” We would think, assuming a correct address, that the Congress wanted the registrant to assume the burden of keeping in touch with his mail, rather than require the postman to find the registrant. . 32 CFR § 1625.1 , § 1625.2. . 32 CFR § 1625.2 , idem. . It is noted that Dr. Benner’s letter of April 18, 1963, supra, does say, “It is my understanding that she has further deteriorated since 1961.” We would not apply all common law evidence rules at the draft board, but this second hand hearsay does not point to anything occurring specifically after February 6, 1963. . Appellant relies heavily on United States v. Packer, 2 Cir., 200 F.2d 540 , and United States v. Vincelli, 2 Cir., 215 F.2d 210 , rehearing 216 F.2d 681 . We think the eases quite distinguishable. For example, in Vincelli the matter was so handled that be never bad an opportunity to make a personal appearance before tbe board on bis claim of minister’s classification, IVD. Here Hamilton can be presumed to have bad bis chance if be bad attended to bis mail in bis absence. In Vincelli, be was clearly presenting new material somewhat as Hamilton bad done prior to February 6, 1963. After tbe time for personal appearance bad gone by, Hamilton’s additional material really weakened bis case. . Conservatorships operating in tbe geriatric field were provided for by tbe California Legislature in 1957. See Sections 1701 to 2207 of tbe California Probate Code. . It is to be noted that 32 CFR 1624.1 provides that “[S]ueh 10-day period (to file a written request for personal appearance) may not be extended.” 32 CFR 1626.2(d) provides that the local appeal board may accept excuses for not appealing on time. This it did on May 14, 1963, giving him all be bad a right to plead for. . Coupled with tbe forwarding of the papers to the appeal board in Vincelli, cited in fn 8, supra, was a course of consideration by tbe board of a claim for IV-A classification really made for tbe first time (and no chance for personal appearance). Out of such a course, it is probably correct to bold there was a reopening. See In Re Lacharity, D.C., 53 F.Supp. 47 , affirmed United States ex rel. Lacharity v. Commanding Officer, 2 Cir., 142 F.2d 381 , to the effect that thinking . about a consideration is a reconsideration. . See 32 CFR § 1626.23 . On May 14, 1963, the board advised Hamilton that his new materia] did not warrant reopening of his classification. . 32 CFR 1625.4 provides : When a registrant, any person who claims to be a dependent of a registrant, any person who has on file a written request for the current deferment of the registrant in a case involving occupational deferment, or the government appeal agent files with the local board a written request to reopen and consider anew the registrant’s classification and the local board is of the opinion that the information accompanying such request fails to present any facts in addition to those considered when the registrant was classified or, even if new facts are presented, the local hoard is of the opinion that such facts, if true, would not justify a change in such registrant’s classification, it shall not reopen the registrant’s classification. In such a case, the local board, by letter, shall advise the person filing the request that the information submitted does not warrant the reopening of the registrant's classification and shall place a copy of the letter in the registrant’s file. No other record of the receipt of such a request and the action taken thereon is required.