This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, 376 U.S. 315 , 84 S.Ct. 748 , 11 L.Ed.2d 732 (1964).

Appellant, Italia, is the shipowner. Appellee, Oregon, is the stevedoring company which rendered the stevedoring services for Italia.

Prior proceedings in this case are reflected in the following extracts from the decision of the Supreme Court:

The issue presented to the Supreme Court was “whether the warranty [implied warranty of workmanlike service] is breached where the stevedore has non-negligently supplied defective equipment which injured one of its employees during the course of stevedoring operations.”

In the course of its opinion the Supx-eme Court stated at page 320, 84 S.Ct. at page 752 :

and at page 318, 84 S.Ct. at page 750 :

In concluding its opinion the Supreme Court stated:

Hence, the only question before us on this remand concerns the effect of the express assumption of liability for negligence provisions in the contract between Italia and Oregon on the existence of the implied warranty.

As stated by the Supreme Court:

‘furnish all necessary labor and supervision and all ordinary gear for the performance of [these] services, * * * including winch drivers and usual appliances used for stevedoring.’ Italia was to furnish and maintain in safe and efficient working condition suitable booms, winches, blocks, steam, lights and so forth. The agreement provided that the stevedoring company would be responsible for damage to the ship, cargo, and for injury or death of any person caused by its negligence, and that the steamship company would be responsible for the injury or death of any person or damage to property arising from its negligence or by reason of failure of the ship’s gear and equipment.2

“2. Paragraph VIII of the agreement states:

The District Court found, inter alia:

1) There is no evidence outside the written contract itself as to the intent of the parties with respect to construction of the stevedore contract, or with respect to implied obligations under said contract.

2) This stevedoring contract was prepared and drawn up by respondent (Oregon) and presented in a printed form.

It is clear to us that the provision in the contract which provides that “The Steamship Company shall be responsible for injury to or loss of property arising through the negligence of the Steamship Company or any of its agents or employees, or by reason of the failure of ship’s gear and/or equipment” cannot be construed to disclaim or negate the existence of the implied warranty of workmanlike service. Under the contract Oregon was required to furnish all ordinary gear, including winch drivers and usual appliances used for stevedoring and the Steamship Company was to furnish suitable booms, winches, blocks, etc. The failure of the “ship’s gear and equipment” refers to the gear furnished by the shipowner and not the gear furnished by the stevedore. The hatch tent and rope were stevedore’s gear and not ship’s gear. The rope, permanently attached to the hatch tent, was furnished by Oregon pursuant to its obligation to supply ordinary gear necessary for the performance of stevedoring services.

To hold that the Steamship Company vis a vis the stevedore agreed to be responsible for failure of the gear furnished by the stevedore would do violence to the express language of the contract.

Oregon contends that the provision of the contract under which Oregon agrees to be responsible “for injury to or death of any person caused by its negligence” negates the existence of the implied-in-fact obligation to perform stevedoring services in a workmanlike manner. We do not agree. The obligation of Oregon to indemnify Italia rests not upon negligence but upon contract. The contract does not expressly negate the existence of the implied-in-fact obligation to perform stevedoring services in a workmanlike manner. See Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc., 305 F.2d 151 (2nd Cir. 1962). Nor do we find any clear expression in the contract that it was the intent of the parties to relieve Oregon of such obligation.

As pointed out by the Supreme Court:

In these circumstances we are unable to hold that the parties, by the language used in the contract, intended that Oregon should be relieved of all liability to its longshoremen who might be injured solely as a result of defective equipment furnished by it and under its control.

The decree of the District Court dismissing Italia’s libel is set aside and the cause is remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Italia and against Oregon for the amount of the indemnity sought.

. The cases referred to appear on pp. 318, 319 and 320 of the Supreme Court decision.