MEMORANDUM

Thomas Anderson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims related to unfavorable judgments by the Oregon state court in prior tort, breach of contract, and family law actions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo both the dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order), and under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Anderson’s claims as barred by the Rook-er-Feldman doctrine because they amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of unfavorable judgments in prior Oregon state court, and raised constitutional claims that were “inextricably intertwined” with those state-court judgments. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 ; Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 778-79 (9th Cir.2012) (under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, claims are inextricably intertwined where “ ‘the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling1 ” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Anderson’s action without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir.2013) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied where the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment).

Anderson’s contentions regarding the alleged inconsistencies in the district court’s reasons for dismissing the action, and the allegedly erroneous application of an abstention doctrine as an alternative basis for dismissal, are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.