MEMORANDUM

Svetlana Kudina appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action challenging her mortgage-related obligations and resulting notices of default. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir.2002), and we affirm.

The district court properly denied Kudi-na’s motion for summary judgment, and granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, because Kudina failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s attempts to enforce contractual obligations regarding an es crow account accompanying her mortgage were fraudulent, negligent, or warranted injunctive relief. See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir.2012) (setting forth preliminary injunction standard); Adams v. King County, 164 Wash.2d 640 , 192 P.3d 891, 902 (2008) (listing the elements of fraud); Caughell v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 124 Wash.2d 217 , 876 P.2d 898, 906 (1994) (listing the elements of negligence); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-60 , 106 S.Ct. 2605 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment must come forward with significant probative evidence as to each element of the claim on which it bears the burden of proof).

Kudina’s contentions regarding the district court’s alleged unfamiliarity with the record, the status of formal foreclosure proceedings, the implications of a post-judgment refund check from CitiMortgage, and the application of the decision in Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc., 175 Wash.2d 83 , 285 P.3d 34 (2012), are unpersuasive.

We do not consider issues referenced in Kudina’s Notice of Appeal but not argued in her briefs, or issues raised for the first time in her reply brief, including regarding discovery, leave to amend, and alleged judicial bias. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 , 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per cu-riam).

Kudina’s motion to supplement the record and her request for judicial notice, filed on September 24 and 25, 2012, are granted.

We treat Kudina’s letter to the court, received on January 27, 2014, as a motion to expedite, and deny it as moot.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.