DISCUSSION

The department argues that the appeal should be dismissed because Pauley’s appellate brief contains no pertinent or intelligible legal argument and violates the California Rules of Court in numerous respects.1 Under the circumstances presented here, we agree with the department. Pauley filed an opening brief in this appeal on October 4, 2013. On October 7, 2013, this court ordered the brief stricken as a result of noncompliance with applicable rules concerning the content and submission of briefs. Among other things, we pointed out that the brief contained no citations to the record on appeal and failed to contain any pertinent or intelligible legal argument. We directed Pauley to file a corrected brief within 15 days. After Pauley failed to file a corrected opening brief, we dismissed the appeal on November 13, 2013. At Pauley’s request, we reinstated the appeal on December 9, 2013. She thereafter filed a second, “corrected” opening brief on December 26, 2013. Like her original opening brief, Pauley’s second opening brief fails to comply with applicable rules governing appellate briefs. The brief contains no citations to the record (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)) and fails to provide this court with a summary of the relevant factual and procedural history (rule 8.204(a)(2)). The rules requiring citations to the record and a summary of the case history are not mere technical requirements that can be easily excused. “It is the duty of [the parties] to refer the reviewing court to the portion of the record which supports appellant’s contentions on appeal. [Citation.]” (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115; see also Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 500, 503, fn. 1 [failure to comply with California Rules of Court requiring summary of material facts supported by appropriate reference to the record may constitute waiver of error].) We are not required to search the record on our own seeking trial court error. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; Del Real v. City of

1 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

3 Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) This basic rule is a corollary to the equally fundamental principle that a judgment is presumed correct on appeal, “and a party attacking the judgment, or any part of it, must affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error. [Citation.]” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881.) We are aware that Pauley brings this appeal without the benefit of legal representation, but her status as a pro. per. litigant does not exempt her from the rules of appellate procedure or relieve her burden on appeal. (See Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246–1247.) We treat pro. per. litigants like any other party, affording them “ ‘the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Id. at p. 1247.) In addition to noncompliance with rules governing appellate briefs, Pauley’s opening brief suffers from an even more fundamental defect because it fails to address in any respect the grounds upon which the trial court based its orders dismissing her complaint. Pauley’s brief fails to explain why she should be excused from filing a timely government tort claim or why the trial court exceeded its discretion in dismissing her complaint after she neglected to file an amended complaint. Instead, the opening brief states, in conclusory fashion, that “[t]he trial court committed error in granting a dismissal of [Pauley’s] case.” Pauley does not explain why the court erred other than to claim the trial judge knew she was not represented by counsel and the Contra Costa County Superior Court is biased in favor of the department. Pauley’s pro. per. status has no bearing on the trial court’s rationale for dismissing the case. Further, Pauley made no claim in the trial court that the assigned judge or the Contra Costa County Superior Court as a whole should be disqualified from hearing her case. There is no basis in the record before this court that would suggest the trial court was unfairly biased against her. In Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119, the court held that “failure of an appellant in a civil action to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument in an opening brief may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed an abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal.” In this case, Pauley’s failure to

4 articulate any relevant legal argument in her opening brief justifies dismissal of the appeal. As a final matter, we note that Pauley sought to file an untimely request for oral argument in response to a notice sent by the clerk of this court after the appeal was fully briefed. A party’s right to oral argument exists in any appeal considered on the merits and decided by written opinion. (See Moles v. Regents of University of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 871; accord, Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1254.) Because we dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits, Pauley does not have a right to oral argument, which we deem unnecessary to our procedural dismissal of the appeal.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

_________________________ McGuiness, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________ Pollak, J.

_________________________ Siggins, J.

5