Marciano Plata v. Edmund Brown, Jr.

Opinion by Judge SCHROEDER; Dissent by Judge BYBEE.

*1072 OPINION

We deal with still another phase of litigation aimed at curing egregious constitutional violations in the operation of the California prison system. The Supreme Court in 2011 said the violations “remain uncorrected” after having “persisted for years.” Brown v. Plata, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1922 , 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011). The Court there affirmed a three judge district court order releasing prisoners in accordance with the strictures of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

California prisons have been operating under a receivership since 2006 to comply with consent decrees. This appeal involves provisions of the PLRA relating to the termination of such decrees. Congress, concerned by what it viewed as unnecessary delays in bringing prison litigation to an end, provided that prison litigation defendants could move to terminate injunctive relief after two years, and that the injunction order would be subject to an automatic stay if the district court took more than thirty days to decide the motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (b)(l)(A)(i), (e)(2).

After the Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court decision…

dissenting:

This case arises out of serious constitutional violations throughout California’s prison system. Brown v. Plata, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1910 , 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011). The complexity of the case notwithstanding, the sole issue before our panel is nominally procedural. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[t]he court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (e)(1). If the district court has not “promptly rule[d]” before the 30th day after the filing of such a motion, the district court’s injunction is automatically stayed. Id. § 3626(e)(2). For good cause, the district court may postpone the effective day of the automatic stay, up to 60 days. Id. § 3626(e)(3). The question presented here is: May the district court avoid the statute’s strict timetable by requiring the State to give 120 days’ notice before it files a motion to terminate? To ask the question is to answer it. The answer is plainly “no.”

I respectfully dissent.

I

“[Ojne of the purposes of the [PLRA] was to restrict severely the intrusion of the judiciary into the operation of…

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARCIANO PLATA; OTIS SHAW; RAY No. 13-15466

STODERD; JOSEPH LONG; LESLIE

RHOADES; GILBERT AVILES; PAUL D.C. No. DECASAS; STEVEN BAUTISTA; 3:01-cv-01351-

RAYMOND JOHNS; ELIJAH J. TEH

SANDOVAL; GARY ALAN SMITH;

CLIFFORD MYELLE; DONDI VAN

HORN, OPINION

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

MEDICAL DEVELOPMENT

INTERNATIONAL,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., Governor of the State of California; JEFFREY

A. BEARD, Dr., Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; ANA

J. MATOSANTOS, Director of the

Department of Finance, Defendants-Appellants,

J. CLARK KELSO,

Receiver-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Thelton E. Henderson, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 11, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed May 28, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges, and Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Schroeder; Dissent by Judge…