facts.” Id. at 1324 (internal quotation marks omitted).

-3- The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Parks failed to

disclose a material fact when he did not disclose to Angelus the owner of the four

Lang properties.1 That nondisclosure is material, because Parks was aware of the

importance to Angelus of knowing “the destination and use of the materials in

question.” Further, this omission is actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A), because Parks

owed Angelus a duty to disclose. Though Angelus submitted no evidence of a

special relationship or customs of the trade, other objective circumstances, In re

Apte, 96 F.3d at 1324, gave rise to the duty. Specifically, the number of prior

transactions between Parks and Angelus, the ratio of Reiger properties to Lang

properties in the subdivision, and Parks’s knowledge that Angelus needed to know

the owner of each property to file a mechanic’s lien together created a duty to

disclose between Parks and Angelus. See also Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Eashai (In re

Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that a duty to disclose exists

when a debtor creates a “facade” that conceals fraudulent intentions not to pay

back a debt).

2. The bankruptcy court did not clearly err when it concluded that “Parks knew

he was giving the impression through nondisclosure that the materials” ordered for

1 Parks claims his disclosure of the properties’ addresses was equivalent to disclosing the owner. He has not provided relevant authority supporting this view.

-4- the four Lang properties were for Rieger properties. That Parks knew of his non-

disclosure is substantiated by the bankruptcy court’s “plausible” view of the

evidence, Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985), that Parks

was trying to get Rieger to pay for the supplies used on the Lang properties.

3. The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Parks “failed to

disclose [the owner of the four Lang properties] with an intent to deceive so as to

accomplish the goal of having Mr. Rieger pay for the amounts that would have

been owed on the Lang project.” Again, we decline to upset the bankruptcy court’s

plausible view of the evidence, especially where heavily intertwined with its

credibility determinations. See Duckett v. Godinez, 109 F.3d 533, 535 (9th Cir.

1997).

4. The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Angelus’s reliance

on Parks’s omission was justifiable. Angelus had received the necessary

information from Parks on over 82 Rieger properties. When Parks ordered

materials for the first Lang property, he notified Angelus of its owner. Under those

circumstances, it was not unjustifiable for Angelus to rely on Parks to inform it

when he ordered materials within the same vicinity of so many Rieger properties

for a non-Rieger property. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995).

-5- 5. Here, the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Parks’s

omission caused Angelus’s damage: “As a consequence of the non-disclosure,

[Angelus] was unable to obtain a lien on the Lang project and the evidence is that

there remain amounts due with respect to the materials supplied to the Lang

project.” Accord In re Apte, 96 F.3d at 1323.

Parks’s claim of no causation, because Angelus was actually paid by Rieger

for the materials used on the Lang properties, fails. The bankruptcy court found,

within its discretion, that Parks improperly directed Angelus to apply payment

from Rieger to the Lang projects, and this error was eventually corrected by

Angelus.

II.

The bankruptcy court’s discretionary evidentiary rulings need not be

reversed. Spasojevic’s testimony struck for lack of personal knowledge was

cumulative of other evidence, so there was no prejudice; Spasojevic’s testimony

struck as hearsay was properly excluded, because Parks offered it for the truth of

the matter asserted. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d at 811.2

2 To the extent Spasojevic’s testimony was offered to impeach Rieger’s testimony, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Spasojevic’s testimony did not contradict Rieger’s “specific” testimony regarding the lack of an agreement between Parks and Rieger. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d at 811.

-6-

III.

The bankruptcy court’s oral ruling, which incorporated by reference

Angelus’s post-trial brief, was explicit enough to give us a clear understanding of

its factual findings and legal conclusions. That suffices under Federal Rule of

Procedure 52(a). Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3, 8 (9th Cir. 1955).

AFFIRMED.

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