Iskanian

Concurring. — I agree that the rule of Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 ] (Gentry), which was announced by a bare four-to-three majority of this court, is inconsistent with and invalid under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) ( 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). I also agree that the class action waiver in this case is not unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.), that defendant CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, did not waive its right to arbitrate, that the arbitration agreement is invalid insofar as it purports to preclude plaintiff Arshavir Iskanian from bringing in any forum a representative action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.), and that this conclusion is not inconsistent with the FAA. However, as explained below, I do not endorse all of the majority’s reasoning and discussion, including its endorsement of dicta in Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109 [ 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 ] (Sonic II). I therefore concur in the judgment.

I. Both Gentry’s Rule…

Concurring and Dissenting. — I join the court’s conclusions as to Arshavir Iskanian’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) claims, which are not foreclosed by his employment contract or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). I disagree with the separate holding that the mandatory class action and class arbitration waivers in Iskanian’s employment contract are lawful. Eight decades ago, Congress made clear that employees have a right to engage in collective action and that contractual clauses purporting to strip them of those rights as a condition of employment are illegal. What was true then is true today. I would reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision in its entirety.

*398 I.

Employment contracts prohibiting collective action, first known as “ ‘ironclads,’ ” date to the 19th century. (Ernst, The Yellow-dog Contract and Liberal Reform, 1917-1932 (1989) 30 Lab. Hist. 251, 252 (The Yellow-dog Contract).) Confronted with collective efforts by workers to agitate for better terms and conditions of employment, employers responded by conditioning employment on the promise not to join together with fellow workers in a union.…

In this case, we again address whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) preempts a state law rule that restricts enforcement of terms in arbitration agreements. Here, an employee seeks to bring a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated employees for his employer’s alleged failure to compensate its employees for, among other things, overtime and meal and rest periods. The employee had entered into an arbitration agreement that waived the right to class proceedings. The question *360 is whether a state’s refusal to enforce such a waiver on grounds of public policy or unconscionability is preempted by the FAA. We conclude that it is and that our holding to the contrary in Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 ] (Gentry) has been abrogated by recent United States Supreme Court precedent. We further reject the arguments that the class action waiver at issue here is unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) and that the employer in this case waived its right to arbitrate by withdrawing its motion to compel arbitration after Gentry .

The employee also…

Filed 6/23/

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

ARSHAVIR ISKANIAN, )

) Plaintiff and Appellant, ) ) S204032 v. ) ) Ct.App. 2/2 B235158

CLS TRANSPORTATION )

LOS ANGELES, LLC, )

) Los Angeles County Defendant and Respondent. ) Super. Ct. No. BC356521 ____________________________________)

In this case, we again address whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts a state law rule that restricts enforcement of terms in arbitration agreements. Here, an employee seeks to bring a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated employees for his employer‘s alleged failure to compensate its employees for, among other things, overtime and meal and rest periods. The employee had entered into an arbitration agreement that waived the right to class proceedings. The question is whether a state‘s refusal to enforce such a waiver on grounds of public policy or unconscionability is preempted by the FAA. We conclude that it is and that our holding to the contrary in Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42…