MEMORANDUM

Adegbenga Adesokan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismiss ing his diversity action arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Adesokan’s wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, cancellation of instruments, and fraud claims because Adesokan failed to allege facts showing tender in the amount of his indebtedness or that the foreclosure sale was void. See Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v. Eischen, 158 Cal.App.3d 575 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 15, 17-18 (1984) (affirming dismissal of fraud claim because failure to tender bars any claims “implicitly integrated” with foreclosure); Karlsen v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 15 Cal.App.3d 112 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 851, 854 (1971) (“A valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust.”); see also Cal.Civ. Code § 2934a(d) (recorded substitution of trustee constitutes conclusive evidence of the authority of the substituted trustee); West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 214 Cal.App.4th 780 , 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 301-02 (2013) (rejecting claim that trustee’s sale was void because substituted trustee had authority to act as trustee under section 2934a(d)).

Dismissal of Adesokan’s claim alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200, was proper because Adesokan lacked standing to maintain a UCL claim based on the alleged fraud. See Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 216 Cal. App.4th 497 , 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 912, 933-34 (2013) (affirming dismissal of UCL challenge to foreclosure where plaintiffs default caused the foreclosure).

We reject Adesokan’s contention that the involvement of a magistrate judge violated his due process rights because the magistrate judge did not enter dispositive orders, and the district judge properly conducted a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and Adesokan’s objections, and entered final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 636 (b)(1)(B) — (C); Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658 (9th Cir.1993) (discussing scope of magistrate judge’s authority under § 636(b)(1)(B)).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.