DISCUSSION

"We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising our independent judgment to determine whether a cause of action has been stated under any

1 First American is also named as a defendant but has not appeared either in the proceedings below or in this court. 2 legal theory." (Shuster v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 505, 509.) We accept as true properly pleaded allegations of material fact, "but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law." (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) We also consider matters subject to judicial notice. (Committee For Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) The burden is on the plaintiff-appellant to demonstrate how an amendment to the complaint could cure the defect. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) A party proceeding in propria persona " '. . . is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.' [Citation.]" (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corporation (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 495, 500.) The appellate court must affirm the trial court's judgment if it is correct on any theory. (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.) Mason's claims are time-barred. Her first claim, for rescission, is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. 3 [setting four-year limit for "action[s] based upon the rescission of a contract in writing"].) The limitations period begins to run from "the date upon which the facts that entitle the aggrieved party to rescind occurred" or, where the rescission claim is grounded in fraud or mistake, from "the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." (Ibid.) Mason's second claim for rescission of the note and deed of trust and her unenumerated claim to quiet title are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. (Id. at §§ 318, 319; Robertson v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1319; see also Martin v. Van Bergen (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 84, 91-92.) Although Mason peppers her pleading with conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, the factual assertions underlying her complaint—that Wells Fargo somehow duped her and her husband into signing a negotiable instrument rather than the "true 'loan'" that they intended—were apparent on the face of the loan instruments themselves. The law presumes that everyone who signs a contract has thoroughly read and understood it and intended whatever the agreement objectively provides, whether or

3 not that is subjectively true. (Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 93.) Thus, the limitations periods began to run in 2003. Mason did not file this action until nearly 10 years later. Her claims are therefore untimely. Even if her claims were timely, Mason lacks standing to pursue them. Mason fails to allege any concrete injury that she suffered from Wells Fargo's securitization of her promissory note. To the extent there was any impropriety in this transaction, " 'the relevant parties . . . were the holders (transferors) of the promissory note and the third party acquirers (transferees) of the note.' . . . [Citation.] [Mason] would not be the victim of such invalid transfers because her obligations under the note remained unchanged." (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corporation, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 501; see also Keshtgar v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1207 ["[A] borrower lacks standing to challenge an assignment [of a note and deed of trust] absent a showing of prejudice," i.e., facts showing that "the original lender would have refrained from foreclos[ing]" notwithstanding the borrower's default].) Moreover, Mason's "vapor money" theory of relief—"the convoluted and nonsensical argument that a plaintiff does not owe the money advanced by the lender on [her] loan because the indebtedness was not funded by the lender with actual money" (Tonea v. Bank of America, N.A. (N.D.Ga. 2014) __ F.Supp.2d __ [2014 WL 1092348, *11])—has been roundly rejected by courts nationwide. (See Miner v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (N.D.Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 1089909, *3.)

DISPOSITION

The trial court's judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Wells Fargo shall recover its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

4 Donna D. Geck, Judge Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

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Jeannie Mason, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Severson & Werson, Jan T. Chilton and Kerry W. Franich for Defendant and Respondent.

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