On October 13, 1952, the United States of America, appellee herein, filed a complaint in condemnation to acquire over 6900 acres of land for military purposes in connection with Lake Mead Base, Nevada. The Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation and Stauffer Chemical Company, appellants herein, owned certain valid mining claims which were in the general vicinity of the property described in the condemnation action, but which mining claims were not acquired in said proceeding. In 1921 the predecessors of appellants constructed a road about 26 miles in length from Stauffer’s mining claims to a railroad siding. Fibreboard’s mining claims were approximately ten miles from the railroad siding. About seven miles of this access road were within the area described in the complaint in condemnation. The question first arose as to whether appellants had any compensable property interest in the access road included within the area condemned. A separate trial was had in the United States District Court for Nevada to determine this question, and that court ruled that appellants did have a compensable property interest in the access roads condemned by the United States and that such action “requires the payment of ‘just compensation’ * * * in accord with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” United States v. 9,947.71 Acres of Land, 220 F.Supp. 328, 337 (D.Nev.1963). The United States took no appeal from this judgment.

A second trial was then had in the District Court before a jury to determine the amount of the compensation to which appellants were entitled. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of appellants in the sum of $168,700. It was the contention of appellants that they were entitled to interest on this amount from October 13, 1952, the date of the filing of the condemnation action, to the date of deposit. Appellee contended that interest should only be allowed from the date in 1959 when “actual expenditures were made by the defendants for a substitute facility” to the date of deposit. The United States District Court awarded interest at the “rate of 6 % per annum from January 1st, 1959, to the date of the deposit into the registry of the court of the said sum of $168,700.00, plus said interest.” Appellants timely appealed to this court “from that portion of the Judgment on the Verdict entered in this action on June 8, 1964, which allows interest on the principal sum of said Judgment from January 1, 1959, rather than from October 13, 1952.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .

The United States also noticed an appeal from the judgment. However, on March 29, 1965, this appeal was dismissed on motion of the appellee. There is thus before us the very narrow question of from which date interest on the judgment is to be allowed.

There is very little dispute in the record as to the relevant facts. On October 13, 1952, the same day upon which the condemnation complaint was filed, the district court on motion of the appellee signed an “Order For Delivery of Possession” which read in part as follows:

In the pretrial order there were contained certain stipulations of the parties, among them the following:

The pretrial order also contained the following:

In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 , 43 S.Ct. 354 , 67 L. Ed. 664 (1923), the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of “just compensation” that must be paid where land is taken by the government in a condemnation action. The Court said:

The above stated rule has been followed in later cases. United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 24 , 78 S.Ct. 1039 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1958) (dictum); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 , 71 S.Ct. 552 , 95 L.Ed. 738 (1950) (dictum); Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599, 602 , 67 S.Ct. 606 , 91 L.Ed. 532 (1946) (dictum); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341 , 47 S.Ct. 611 , 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1927). The Ninth Circuit also applied this rule in United States v. Johns, 146 F.2d 92 (9 Cir. 1944).

The right to interest from the date of taking to the date of payment thus being established, the next question is the determination as to when was the date of taking.

As shown above, in this case an order for immediate possession of the land to be taken was obtained upon the filing of the condemnation suit on October 13, 1952. The stipulation of the parties was that from some date between October 13, 1952, and October 13, 1953, appellants were denied access to their road and a portion of the road was physically destroyed. The fact that a new road was not built until 1959 does not appear to us to be determinative of the question in issue. When the government has not filed a declaration of taking pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 258a, the date of taking is the date upon which the government enters into possession. United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 24 , 78 S.Ct. 1039 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1958). From a stipulation of the parties it would appear that the date of taking was at least October 13, 1953, and that interest upon the amount of the judgment should run from that date.

The government’s contention is that in this case the “taking” was a “technical taking” and for that no compensation should be due. Its reliance on the case of Marion & Rye Valley Ry. v. United States, 270 U.S. 280 , 46 S.Ct. 253 , 70 L.Ed. 585 (1925), is misplaced. In that case there was a claim for compensation “for the alleged taking possession and use by the United States of its railroad during the period beginning December 28, 1917, and ending June 29, 1918.” This claim was denied by the Supreme Court. However, the facts were entirely different from those in the case at bar. In that case the Supreme Court speaking of the Presidential proclamation, in reference to the possession and control of systems of transportation in the United States, said:

The government also cites cases where publicly-owned roads have been taken and where it has been held that compensation is only payable “to the extent that, as a result of such taking, it (the public body) is compelled to construct a substitute highway.” These cases are not apposite here where private property has been condemned.

That portion of the judgment of the district court which allows interest on the judgment from January 1, 1959, is reversed and the district court is directed to allow interest on the judgment at six per cent per annum from October 13, 1953, to the date of the deposit into the registry of the court of the sum of $168,700.00 plus said interest.

. State of California v. United States, 169 F.2d 914, 924 (9 Cir. 1948). E. g., United States v. Des Moines County, 148 F.2d 448 , 160 A.L.R. 953 (8tli Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 743 , 66 S.Ct. 56 , 90 L.Ed. 444 (1945); Jefferson County v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 146 F.2d 564 (6 Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 , 65 S.Ct. 1016 , 89 L.Ed. 1425 (1945).