Steen

In this case we consider the validity of a misdemeanor complaint issued by a superior court clerk under the authority of Penal Code section 959.1, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 959.1(c)). The statute provides that “[a] magistrate or court is authorized to receive and file an accusatory pleading in electronic form if,” among other things, “[t]he accusatory pleading is issued in the name of, and transmitted by, a public prosecutor or law enforcement agency . . . , or by a clerk of the court with respect to complaints issued for the offenses of failure to appear, pay a fine, or comply with an order of the court.” (§ 959.1(c) & (c)(1), italics added.) Petitioner, who pied no contest to the misdemeanor of willfully violating her written promise to appear (Veh. Code, § 40508, subd. (a)), charged in a complaint electronically generated by a court clerk, now challenges the ensuing conviction. Invoking the California Constitution’s separation of powers (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 3) and due process (id., art. I, §§ 7, subd. (a), 15) clauses, petitioner contends the complaint was void because it was not issued by an executive branch officer with prosecutorial authority. Based on…

Concurring. — There is much in today’s opinion I agree with. I agree that Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 814 , 729 P.2d 80 ] forecloses petitioner’s due process claim. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1056-1057.) As to petitioner’s separation of powers claim, I agree that “the initiation of criminal proceedings is a core, inherent function of the executive branch” (id. at p. 1053); that Government Code section 100, subdivision (b) makes clear that “all prosecutions shall be conducted in [the] name [of the People of California] and by their authority”; that Penal Code section 684 similarly says “[a] criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the people of the State of California, as a party . . .”; and that “the Legislature did not intend for complaints to issue ‘in the name of’ the clerk” when it enacted Penal Code section 959.1, subdivision (c). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1051.)

The problem, however, is that the complaint in this case was issued by a court clerk, an official with no authority to prosecute a criminal action in the name of the People of California. Although the signature of the “DECLARANT AND COMPLAINANT” is hard to make out, the parties…

I. BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2002, a police officer cited petitioner Jewerelene Steen for three infractions of the Vehicle Code: driving a vehicle with an expired registration (Veh. Code, § 4000, subd. (a)(1)), driving without a license (id., § 12500,

2 subd. (a)), and failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility (id., § 16028, subd. (a)). Petitioner signed a written promise to appear in court on or before July 23, 2002, to answer for those infractions (see id., § 40500) and was thereupon released. When petitioner failed to appear, the clerk of the court for the Los Angeles County Superior Court, on August 13, 2002, electronically generated and filed against her a complaint for the misdemeanor of willfully violating her promise to appear. (Id., § 40508, subd. (a).) The complaint was one of thousands created by the clerk on a weekly basis by means of a computer program that matches citation data from county traffic record information systems with data about delinquencies entered by the court’s deputy clerks. About five years later, on July 27, 2007, petitioner appeared with counsel before a court commissioner. Respondent informs us that the vast majority of offenses…