On February 1, 1962, the appellant filed an application to establish a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits, under the provisions of the Social Security Act, alleging that he had been unable to work since May 1961, because of specified injuries, ailments and diseases. The appellant’s application was denied by the Social Security Administration and appellant’s request for reconsideration was likewise denied. Appellant requested a hearing before a Hearing Examiner.

A hearing was had before a Hearing Examiner. The Examiner found in his decision rendered January 24, 1964, that the appellant had, on January 1, 1961, been “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act; that such disability continued up to and during the effective period of his application; and applicant was accordingly entitled to a period of disability and the disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act on the basis of his application.

Based on the decision of the Hearing Examiner, the period of disability beginning January 1, 1961, was established and the appellant was awarded disability insurance benefits commencing at the end of the six months waiting period established by the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a), effective July 1, 1961.

The appellant filed a request that the Appeals Council review the Hearing Examiner’s decision, the appellant contending that he was dissatisfied with the date of the establishment of the period of his disability, and of the effect of his entitlement to disability insurance benefits. This request for review was denied by the Appeals Council and the decision of the Hearing Examiner thereupon became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

The appellant on July 17, 1964, filed a petition for review of the Hearing Examiner’s decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Southern Division.

The District Court, on April 26, 1965, entered an order in the action affirming the decision of the hearing officer. A timely appeal to this court was filed by the appellant.

The record reveals that the appellant had earlier filed applications for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits on July 8, 1960, and September 7, 1960, respectively, alleging in the first application that he became unable to work on December 17, 1955, and in the second in January 1960. These duplicate claims were based upon impairments including, among others, the injuries, ailments and diseases specified in the application filed on February 1, 1962. These applications were denied through all administrative levels of the Social Security Administration and following a hearing held on August 14, 1961, by a hearing examiner who, in his decision rendered August 29, 1961, found that the appellant was not disabled within the meaning of the Act at any time on or before December 7, 1960, that is, at any time prior to the expiration of the three month effective life of the appellant’s duplicate application filed on September 7, 1960. Following a denial by the Appeals Council on October 31, 1961, of the appellant’s request for review of the hearing examiner’s decision the appellant, through an attorney, on February 21, 1962, brought an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Southern Division, and on January 19, 1963, that court affirmed the hearing examiner’s decision which was the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Myers v. Celebrezze, Civil No. 2691-SD-W, S.D.Calif., SD. The appellant in the instant case took no appeal from the judgment of the district court entered on January 18, 1963, affirming the hearing examiner’s decision on appellant’s prior claims.

In its order affirming the decision of the Hearing Examiner, as affirmed by the Appeals Council, the District Court stated, inter alia:

We are in complete agreement with the views expressed by the District Court. In our view there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of fact and the decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare that the appellant was not disabled, within the meaning of the Social Security Act, prior to January 1, 1961.

We are further satisfied that the District Court properly applied the doctrine of res adjudicate/, to the instant case. See Hobby v. Hodges, 215 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1954); Eplin v. Celebrezze, 214 F.Supp. 836 (S.D.W.Va., 1963); Rivers v. Celebrezze, 217 F.Supp. 141 (W.D.Va., 1963).

We have considered other contentions raised by appellant on this appeal and find them to be without merit.

The order of the District Court is affirmed.

. 49 Stat. 623 , as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., § 223 of the Act, [ 42 U.S.C. § 423 ], in pertinent part provides: “(a) (1) Every individual who— (A) is insured for disability insurance benefits (* * *) (B) has not attained the age of sixty-five, (C) has filed application for disability insurance benefits, and (D) is under a disability ( * * ) shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit (i) for each month beginning with the first month after his'waiting period ( * * * ) in which he becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits, qj* í . See Code of Federal Regulations, Title 20 —Employees’ Benefits, §§ 404.917 and 404.918. . Sec. 205(g) of the Social Security Act [ 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g)] reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “(g) Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, * *, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action * * * in the district court of the United States * * *. As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and deci sion complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to any fact if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, s¡ * *>»