United States v. Fidel Mendez

MEMORANDUM

1. The district court properly rejected Fidel Mendez’s Second Amendment challenge. Mendez’s prior juvenile adjudication is a conviction of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” under 18 U.S.C. §‘ 921(a)(20). See United States v. Mendez, — F.3d - (9th Cir.2014). As an individual with a prior conviction satisfying § 921(a)(20), Mendez is “categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms.” United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.2010). Section 922(g)(1) is a “presumptively lawful regulatory measure [ ]” and does not unconstitutionally burden whatever Second Amendment rights Mendez may have. See id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 , 627 n. 26, 128 S.Ct. 2783 , 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008)).

2. Mendez also contends, citing our decision in United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2001), that the use of his juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense violated his due process rights. But Tighe raised an Apprendi issue — whether the fact of a juvenile adjudication needed to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury — and has nothing to say about the use of a juvenile…