MEMORANDUM

Michael A. Carnacehi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Clark v. Yosemite Cmty. Coll. Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir.1986), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Carnacchi’s RICO claim as barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because Car-nacchi’s RICO claim was based on the same primary right asserted in a prior state court action that was dismissed without leave to amend. See id. (federal courts look to state law to determine the preclu-sive effect of a state court judgment); Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal.4th 888 , 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 51 P.3d 297, 301, 306-07 (2002) (setting forth elements of the doctrine of claim preclusion under California’s primary rights theory); Keidatz v. Albany, 249 P.2d 264, 265 (Cal. 1952) (the sustaining of a demurrer and an adjudication that the facts alleged do not state a claim is a judgment on the merits and bars a second action unless new facts cure defects in the original pleading).

Contrary to Carnacchi’s contention, the public policy exception to California’s claim preclusion law does not apply in this case. See Clark, 785 F.2d at 788 (relief is granted in “unusual circumstances” to prevent “manifest injustice” and “appears to be limited to situations where the doctrine of [claim preclusion] prevents relitigation of pure questions of law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject Carnacchi’s' contention regarding the ultra vires doctrine.

Carnacchi’s pending motions for judicial notice and oral argument are denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.