United States v. Ute Jarlik Bell

concurring in part, dissenting in part:

I concur in the majority’s paragraph 3 of the memorandum disposition holding that *554 the government has presented sufficient evidence to show that Jarlik-Bell knew the tax returns to be false or fraudulent. But I dissent from the majority’s conclusion in paragraphs 1-2 of the memorandum disposition that the district court properly admitted evidence of Jarlik-Bell’s two traffic stops. I would reverse the district court on this issue.

Evidence of prior crimes or actions “must be narrowly circumscribed and limited” and “may not be introduced unless the government establishes its relevance to an actual issue in the case.” United States v. Hodges, 770 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir.1985). I do not see how the two traffic stops are relevant to prove Jarlik-Bell’s knowledge that the tax returns were false or fraudulent. The first traffic stop, where Jarlik-Bell handed Officer Flohr a blank Form 199-OID, showed her knowledge about the form itself, not her knowledge that its use in connection with her joint tax return with Raymond Bell was part of a fraudulent scheme to evade taxes and gain fraudulent refunds. The second traffic stop, where Jarlik-Bell…

MEMORANDUM *

Defendant Ute Christine Jarlik Bell appeals from her jury conviction for making false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims to the United States Treasury under 18 U.S.C. § 28 ,7.

1. Defendant first contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence of two traffic stops, arguing that the evidence is not relevant to prove knowledge and that it does not satisfy the require *553 ments of Rule 404(b). We review the district court’s decision for plain error because Defendant did not object before the district court. United States v. Begay, 673 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc). Evidence of prior acts is inadmissible to prove character, but is admissible to prove knowledge. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(l)-(2).

Relevancy requires only that the evidence have “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401(a). The first traffic stop, where Defendant handed Officer Flohr a blank Form 1099-OID to pay her traffic ticket, is relevant to show her knowledge of the Form 1099-OID scheme. The second traffic stop, where Defendant refused to recognize the authority of Officer Flohr and identified herself as a “Peace Officer…

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 22 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30165

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:11-cr-05407-RBL-

v.

MEMORANDUM*

UTE CHRISTINE JARLIK BELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 28, 2014 Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Defendant Ute Christine Jarliµ Bell appeals from her jury conviction for

maµing false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims to the United States Treasury under

18 U.S.C. y 287.

1. Defendant first contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence

of two traffic stops, arguing that the evidence is not relevant to prove µnowledge

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. and that it does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 404(b). We review the district

court's decision for…