(dissenting):

I concurred in the majority opinion filed November 28, 1966. At this late date, January 30, 1967, I have decided that I should dissent.

Sessions here entered a plea of guilty. He now claims that events transpiring before he entered the plea were such that duress was placed upon him. The majority holds that appellant has alleged suf *371 ficient facts indicating coercion that he should have been given a hearing. I disagree.

Appellant contends that the circumstances of his age (18) and the promises that he alleges the police made him (that they would see that the judge went easy on him and that no charge of burglary would be made) constituted coercion. Appellant correctly maintains that one test in determining whether a confession has been coerced is to ask if the accused’s will was “overborne” at the time he confessed, Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 , 74 S.Ct. 716 , 98 L.Ed. 948 . He is not able, however, to bring his own situation within the facts of the “coercion” cases that he claims are controlling. He does not say he was irrational as was the defendant in Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 , 80 S.Ct. 274 , 4 L.Ed.2d 242 ; no threats of retribution against his family are asserted as in Spano v. People of State of New York, 360 U.S. 315 , 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 , and Harris v. State of South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 , 69 S.Ct. 1354 , 93 L.Ed. 1815 ; there was no marathon period of questioning by teams of interrogators as in Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 , 64 S.Ct. 921 , 88 L.Ed. 1192 , and Gladden v. Holland, 9 Cir., 366 F.2d 580 ; and petitioner was not injured when questioned as was the case in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 .

At the time the alleged coercion took place, the preliminary examination record indicates that petitioner was a fairly articulate eighteen-year-old who held down a job and owned a car. After being arrested he confessed to the armed holdup of a tavern. He asked for counsel directly after his arrest, but his request was denied. He then alleges that he was told that if he confessed things would go easier for him and that a potential burglary charge would be dropped. He did confess and then repeated the confession in court after waiving the proffered offer of counsel. 1

As a result of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , the likelihood of the present ease arising on new facts is remote. But these cases do not apply here as Sessions was convicted on January 15, 1957. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 . It would seem that one of the reasons for the Supreme Court’s decisions in Escobedo and Miranda was to fill the gap between where the “coercion” cases leave off and where fair conduct begins. Thus, Esco-bedo was questioned by police officers, one of whom had grown up in his neighborhood, was denied access to counsel, was questioned while handcuffed in a standing position, and was more or less tricked into admitting complicity in a murder when it was obvious that he did not realize that “ * * * an admission of ‘mere’ complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of firing the fatal shots.” 378 U.S. at 486, 84 S.Ct. at 1762. Despite these facts, the Supreme Court made no finding of coercion, but focused on the issue of denial of counsel.

Every alleged threat or promise of favor made to a prisoner does not call for an evidentiary hearing. Neither common sense nor controlling principles of law indicate such a result. We should be especially leery of such a doctrine in cases where a guilty plea has been entered.

Sessions also claims that he was entitled to counsel at his preliminary hearing. If we concede that the preliminary examination was a critical stage in the proceeding and therefore counsel should have been appointed, Wilson v. Harris, 9 Cir., 351 F.2d 840 , it is apparent that petitioner intelligently waived counsel. As stated above, Sessions, at the time of the trial, was an articulate eighteen-year-old *372 with a job and a car. At the preliminary examination the judge carefully read the complaint charging Sessions with armed robbery. The judge then twice told petitioner that he had a right to counsel and then told him that he had the right to a reasonable time in which to secure counsel and that the court would appoint counsel for him if he wished. He was then twice asked if he wanted an attorney and twice answered that he did not. He then indicated that he wanted to take the stand immediately.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that appellant was not in a position to intelligently waive counsel. The trial judge seems to have gone out of his way to protect petitioner in this regard.

I disapprove of the language in the majority opinion which suggests that the trial judge must discuss with a defendant the necessarily included offenses contained within a crime with which he is charged, all possible defenses to the charge and circumstances in mitigation thereof. In an individual case some or all of these matters may merit discussion, but it is a mistake to make them a general requirement. I believe that these specifications have not been followed as a general rule by any district judge in the Ninth Circuit.

Of interest is the fact that the requirements that the majority would have us elevate to constitutional dimensions were suggested by way of dicta in the case of Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 , 68 S.Ct. 316 , 92 L.Ed. 309 . I read this case as standing for the proposition that a trial judge has a heavy burden in determining whether counsel is understanding^ waived. I do not read it as requiring the trial judge to ask the specific questions that the majority points out were not asked here.

The Constitution contains no requirement that a person be forced to be represented by counsel. Carter v. People of State of Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 , 67 S.Ct. 216 , 91 L.Ed. 172 ; Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra; United States v. Redfield, D.C. Nev., 197 F.Supp. 559 ; aff’d per curiam, 9 Cir., 295 F.2d 249 ; United States v. Washington, 3rd Cir., 341 F.2d 277 .

Sessions’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus was turned down by the California Supreme Court. It was again denied by the district court. I see no reason why it should not be turned down here.

In sum, I think Miranda, supra, and Johnson, supra, are good authority for affirming here.

. It is worthy of note that during his hearing Sessions stated that he was making his confession voluntarily and that nothing had been promised him to induce him to make it.