Samara

DISCUSSION

Samara does not challenge the trial court’s ruling her action against Dr. Nahigian is time-barred, expressly limiting her appeal to its alternate ruling on the issue of causation. Her appellate brief argues her expert’s declaration adequately raised a triable issue of material fact on the issue of causation and urges us to reverse the trial court’s decision on that point to preclude any use of its finding by Dr. Matar under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because Samara concedes judgment was properly entered against her, we affirm. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 575-576 [judgments are presumed to be correct, and appellant bears burden of affirmatively proving prejudicial error]; Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 [same].) We need not, and do not, reach the court’s alternative ground for granting summary judgment. (See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1119, fn. 4 [appellate court reviews propriety of trial court’s judgment rather than its stated reasons for its decision]; Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 602, 628 [“[i]n light of our conclusion that AMG was entitled to judgment…