MEMORANDUM

Eagle Investors, a Nevada corporation, appeals from the district court’s order denying its motion for a preliminary injunction in this diversity action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1). We vacate and remand.

The district court erred in concluding that Eagle Investors has not shown a likelihood of irreparable harm. Where, as here, a right of action arises under state law, state law must also govern the extent to which damages are available to vindicate that right. See Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1064-65 (9th Cir.2003); Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir.1982). Under Nevada law, “real property and its attributes are considered unique and loss of real property rights generally results in irreparable harm” — that is, harm that cannot be adequately remedied through money damages. Dixon v. Thatcher, 103 Nev. 414 , 742 P.2d 1029, 1030 (1987) (per curiam); see also Hamm v. Arrowcreek Homeowners’ Ass’n, 124 Nev. 290 , 183 P.3d 895, 901 (2008) (en banc) (“[Hjarm is ‘irreparable’ if it cannot adequately be remedied by compensatory damages.”). The Nevada Supreme Court has viewed the loss of real property as irreparable harm even where the real property’s putative owner is a corporate entity, and where the real property is to be used for a commercial purpose. See Thirteen S. Ltd. v. Summit Vill., Inc., 109 Nev. 1218 , 866 P.2d 257, 259 (1993) (per curiam); Stoltz v. Grimm, 100 Nev. 529 , 689 P.2d 927, 930 (1984) (per curiam). Thus, under Nevada law, Eagle Investors’ loss of real property would constitute irreparable harm.

We VACATE the district court’s order denying Eagle Investors’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and REMAND so that the district court can consider the remaining preliminary injunction factors in the first instance. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 , 129 S.Ct. 365 , 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).

VACATED and REMANDED. Appel-lees shall bear costs on appeal.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.