Piper
Piper v. Department of Motor Vehicles
Opinion
Opinion
Duarte, J.
The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appeals from a judgment granting a petition for writ of ordinary mandate compelling it to set aside its calculation of the period of postconviction suspension of licensee Charles James Piper (Piper), contending the trial court misconstrued the statutes governing the interplay of suspensions due to administrative actions by DMV and criminal actions in drunk driving (DUI) cases. We agree with DMV, and therefore shall reverse with directions to deny the writ.
BACKGROUND
After Piper was arrested for DUI on July 4, 2012, he was issued an administrative per se suspension notice, alleging his blood-alcohol reading exceeded 0.08 percent. After a hearing, DMV suspended his driver’s license effective September 19, 2012, through January 18, 2013 (four months). (Veh. Code, § 13353.3, subd. (b)(1); see Zink v. Gourley (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 774 , 779-780 & fn. 6 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 896 ] (Zink).) The written order states in capital letters: “This action is independent of any other action taken by the court or this Department.” (See Robertson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 938, 948-949 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 319 ] (Robertson).)