Roy Fisher v. Tucson Unified School District
Opinion
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
The Tucson Unified School District appeals four interlocutory orders issued by the district court in this school desegregation case. We dismiss the appeal.
As an initial matter, we grant the District’s and the Mendoza Plaintiffs’ unopposed motions for judicial notice, as well as the District’s supplemental request for judicial notice. We take judicial notice of the district court filings in this case that postdate the District’s notice of appeal.
The District argues that this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) because the appealed orders “modified and amended prior existing injunctive orders, namely the Appointment Order ... and the USP....” The Unitary Status Plan can be characterized as a consent decree. We therefore apply the three-part test set forth by the Supreme Court in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 , 101 S.Ct. 993 , 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), to determine whether this court has jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(1). United States v. El Dorado Cnty., Cal., 704 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir.2013) (“[A] court reviewing an interlocutory order involving a consent decree should apply Carson , not just section 1292(a)(1) alone, to determine…