Prentice Jones v. Gary Sandor

' MEMORANDUM *

On the federal claim certified for appeal to this court, Petitioner contends that sufficient evidence did not support his second-degree robbery conviction on an aiding and abetting theory. Reviewing the last reasoned state court decision, see Cannedy v. *619 Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir.2013) cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1001 , 187 L.Ed.2d 863 (2014), we note that the California Court of Appeal rejected this federal claim. We owe deference to the Court of Appeal’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), because it was not “contrary to,” and did not “involve[ ] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” nor did it “result[ ] in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 , 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).

Here, a car registered to Jones was parked adjacent to the gas station that was robbed, and there was evidence from which a rational jury could infer that Jones was in the car, poised for getaway, at the…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

I recognize that we owe “double deference” to the state court’s decision. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir.2005). Nonetheless, in my view, the state court’s decision here involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent and was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), (2). The evidence showed that the perpetrator left in Jones’ car after robbing the store, that the car was backed into its parking place in a nearby lot, that the car was parked in a way that did not allow Jones to see that the store was being robbed, and that Jones was sitting in the passenger seat during the robbery and when the robber drove away. Certainly Jones was present during the getaway. But even seen through our very deferential lens, the evidence was insufficient to permit a rational jury to find that Jones knew of the robbery and intended to assist in its successful commission.

facts in light of the record evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The evidence

showed that the perpetrator left in Jones’ car after robbing the store, that the car

was backed into its parking place in a nearby lot, that the car was parked in a way

that did not allow Jones to see that the store was being robbed, and that Jones was

sitting in the passenger seat during the robbery and when the robber drove away.

Certainly Jones was present during the getaway. But even seen through our very

deferential lens, the evidence was insufficient to permit a rational jury to find that

Jones knew of the robbery and intended to assist in its successful commission.