Lawrence E. Wilson, Warden, San Quentin Prison v. William A. Anderson
Opinion
lead Opinion
Duniway, J.
Anderson was convicted in California Superior Court of the crime of forgery, iCal.Pen.C. § 470. His conviction was affirmed by the California District Court of Appeal. He then sought release by habeas corpus in the United States District Court. Anderson was tried before the decision in Griffin v. State of California, 1965, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 . The trial judge instructed the jury that it could consider Anderson’s failure to testify and the prosecutor in his opening and closing arguments, referred to Anderson’s failure to testify. Under Griffin, this was error, and the California District Court of Appeal so held. However, i.t also held that the error, as well as certain other errors, was harmless, and affirmed the judgment under the California “harmless error” rule, set out in Article VI, section 4% of the California Constitution. 1
The District Judge did not hold a hearing; the parties agreed that he need not. Instead, agreeing with the California Court that the Griffin rule had been violated, he concluded that the error required that the conviction be set aside, regardless of prejudice. 2 Anderson was ordered discharged, and his custodian, the Warden of…
dissent Opinion
Ely, J.
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. The introduction of statements made by the accused would now be constitutionally impermissible. They were admitted over objeetion, and while the appellee suffered whatever disadvantageous interpretation may have been placed upon them, he was effectively deprived of the benefit of portions of the statements which might have operated in his favor. As to them, the opinion of the California appellate court recites, “Appellant’s statements were not a confession. He consistently denied endorsing the forged instrument. At most, his statements connect him with transmitting the check to Kernen, but not with knowledge of the forgery.” Conceding that we may have disagreed with a verdict of acquittal, in the event there had been one, the jury was practically disempowered, by unconstitutional procedures, to accept the appellee’s protestations, made in his statements, of his innocence. 1 I hold the view that when it *336 was not unlawful to use it, the prosecutor’s most destructive weapon was comment upon a defendant’s failure to testify in exculpation. For that reason I could not say, in any case wherein there is evidence, as here, which might have…
Opinion
379 F.2d 330 Lawrence E. WILSON, Warden, San Quentin Prison, Appellant, v. William A. ANDERSON, Appellee. No. 20977. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. June 16, 1967. Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Albert W. Harris, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Louise H. Renne, Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. John H. Sears, San Francisco, Cal., for appellee. Before MADDEN, Judge, Court of Claims, and DUNIWAY and ELY, Circuit Judges. DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge: 1 Anderson was convicted in California Superior Court of the crime of forgery, Cal.Pen.C. § 470. His conviction was affirmed by the California District Court of Appeal. He then sought release by habeas corpus in the United States District Court. Anderson was tried before the decision in Griffin v. State of California, 1965, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 . The trial judge instructed the jury that it could consider Anderson's failure to testify and the prosecutor in his opening and closing arguments, referred to Anderson's failure to testify. Under Griffin, this was error, and the California District Court of Appeal so held. However, it also held that the error, as well as certain…