Merrill Mack Moser and Jackson Fee v. United States

Good Law
381 F.2d 363·1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJuly 28, 196720588California819 words

Opinion

Opinion

Appellants were indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of California, July 27, 1963, for the crime of bank robbery ( 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a)) allegedly committed by them in Los Angeles, California on June 17, 1963. They were tried and convicted June 1, 1965, approximately 22 months later.

On this appeal appellants contend that this delay constituted a violation of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment and additionally that their confessions, which were admitted over their objection at the trial, were coerced.

1. SPEEDY TRIAL

“The right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.” Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 , 25 S.Ct. 573, 576 , 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905). And “the authorities demonstrate that the balance between the rights of public justice and those of the accused has been upset against the Government only where the delay has been arbitrary, purposeful, oppressive or vexatious.” Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 784, 787 , 118 U.S.App.D.C. 38 (1964). Thus viewed, the delay in bringing these defendants to…

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