Yair Jackoby v. Geico General Ins Co

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of GEICO and denial of summary judgment for Jackoby. Nevada interprets ambiguities in an insurance contract against the drafter, here the insurer. Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W, Inc., —Nev.-, 329 P.3d 614 , 616 (2014): But I would affirm and conclude that Geico properly denied stacking Jackoby’s UIM coverages. All factors relevant under Nevada law when construing an ambiguous insurance policy, including an aim to effectuate the “insured’s reasonable expectations,” in my view support denying Jackoby unwarranted coverage in this case. Century Sur. Co., 329 P.3d at 616 (emphasis added); see Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ceasars Palace Hotel & Casino, 106 Nev. 330 , 792 P.2d 1129, 1130 (1990). I do not believe Jacko-by had a “reasonable expectation” to triple his UIM benefits simply because he was on a bicycle instead of in a car or on foot when injured. Even if “bicycle” had been • expressly listed in his policy, we would have the same problem if Jackoby had instead been on a skateboard or in a rickshaw.

Further, I do not believe that the majority’s…

MEMORANDUM

Yair Jackoby (“Jackoby”) appeals the order of the district court denying him summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of GEICO General Insurance Company (“GEICO”) in Jackoby’s action for underinsured/uninsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits. Jackoby maintains that the anti-stacking provision in his GEICO automobile insurance policy is ambiguous and did not preclude the stacking of multiple insurance coverage limits when he was injured in an accident while riding a bicycle. 1 We review the district court’s grant of GEICO’s motion and the denial of Jackoby’s motion de novo. CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metro. Transp. Dist., 669 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir.2012). We reverse.

I

Under Nevada law, a valid anti-stacking provision must be clear and prominently displayed, and the policyholder must not have purchased separate coverage on the same risk. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 687B.145(1); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coatney, 118 Nev. 180 , 42 P.3d 265, 267 (2002). Anti- *546 stacking language is unambiguous if it is “truly comprehensible to the average insured.” Bove v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 106 Nev. 682 , 799 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1990). Furthermore, “ ‘any ambiguity or…

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 09 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YAIR JACKOBY, No. 12-16917

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-0307-LRH-

WGC

v.

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE MEMORANDUM*

COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 21, 2014* San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and OLIVER, Chief District Judge.**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. Yair Jackoby (“Jackoby”) appeals the order of the district court denying him

summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of GEICO General

Insurance Company (“GEICO”) in Jackoby’s action for underinsured/uninsured

motorist (“UIM”)…