Camp

Dissenting.- — I respectfully dissent. Reading the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (the Realignment Act) in a plain, commonsense manner (see People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1421 [ 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 , 324 P.3d 827 ]), the trial court erred by terminating Hugo Joseph Camp’s period of mandatory supervision and releasing him from serving the remainder of his suspended sentence. In reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority engages in an overly broad construction of the language of Penal Code 1 sections 1170, former subdivision (h)(5)(B)(i) (“The period of supervision shall be mandatory, and may not be earlier terminated except by court order.”) and 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1) (“Upon its own motion or upon the petition of the supervised person, the probation or parole officer, or the district attorney, the court may modify, revoke, or terminate supervision of the person pursuant to this subdivision, except that the court shall not terminate parole pursuant to this section.”). These provisions cannot reasonably be read as broad or unlimited grants of authority to terminate the mandatory supervision period. The majority also disregards the trial court’s limited…

*464 Opinion

I.

INTRODUCTION

After Hugo Joseph Camp entered into a plea agreement with the People, the trial court imposed a stipulated split sentence 1 of 28 months, with 14 months to be served in local custody and 14 months under mandatory supervision. In preparing for Camp’s release from custody, the probation officer filed a report indicating that the officer had recently learned that Camp was ineligible for mandatory supervision because he was subject to an immigration hold and would be deported upon his release from custody. At a hearing to consider this issue, defense counsel requested that the court terminate the mandatory supervision portion of Camp’s sentence and permit him to be deported. The trial court agreed, terminated the mandatory supervision portion of Camp’s sentence, and ordered Camp released to an immigration enforcement agent.

On appeal, the People contend that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in terminating the mandatory supervision portion of Camp’s split sentence. The People maintain that the court’s only options were to order Camp to serve the remainder of the 28-month sentence in custody, or permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm…

I.

INTRODUCTION

After Hugo Joseph Camp entered into a plea agreement with the People, the trial

court imposed a stipulated split sentence1 of 28 months, with 14 months to be served in

local custody and 14 months under mandatory supervision. In preparing for Camp's

release from custody, the probation officer filed a report indicating that the officer had

recently learned that Camp was ineligible for mandatory supervision because he was

subject to an immigration hold and would be deported upon his release from custody. At

a hearing to consider this issue, defense counsel requested that the court terminate the

mandatory supervision portion of Camp's sentence and permit him to be deported. The

trial court agreed, terminated the mandatory supervision portion of Camp's sentence, and

ordered Camp released to an immigration enforcement agent.

On appeal, the People contend that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in

terminating the mandatory supervision portion of Camp's split sentence. The People

maintain that the court's only options were to order Camp to serve the remainder of the

28-month sentence in custody, or permit him to withdraw his…