This case comes before us for a second time. In a decision reported at 329 F.2d 635 , we reversed in part and remanded to the district court, which thereafter stayed its proceedings and ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration. The propriety of that ruling is here at issue.

The jurisdiction of the district court was founded on diversity of citizenship; appellants Riess are citizens of California, while appellee Murchison is a citizen of Texas and the Simi Valley Development Company — the other appellee — is organized under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in Texas. The sum in controversy well exceeds the requisite $10,000 amount. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).

The case comes to us pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1964). On April 11, 1966, the district court certified that the order here at issue involved a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and that an immediate appeal might materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. C.T. 221-22. On May 11, 1966, this court permitted the appeal.

The factual context into which the questions of this case are set is not uncomplicated, and may perhaps best be set out by referring initially to the summary contained in our previous opinion:

Our previous decision contained a number of rulings. We held, first,' that the district court had erred in denying that the contract was susceptible of total breach; and, further, we characterized as “gratuitous” that court’s finding that there had been no total breach — for the reason, among others, that certain evidence relating to that question had been excluded in accord with the court’s position that the contract was not susceptible of total breach. 329 F.2d at 639-640, n. 2 . Second, we held that the trial court had been correct in ruling that the voluntary-payments were not to be credited against the $48,000 due under the contract during the first two years after the consummation date. Finally, we ruled that the court below had erred in holding that the buyers’ duty to build or install the reservoir and pipelines by June 12, 1958, was absolute and unconditional regardless of the sufficiency of the water. We then added:

Pursuant to this last ruling, appellees on remand again requested the trial court to refer the matter to arbitration. Appellants proceeded to file a third amended complaint, emphasizing the buyers’ alleged repudiation of the contract, and appellees then moved for a stay. Hearings followed concerning the propriety of arbitration, at the'conclusion of which the district court granted appellees’ motion. The court ruled that neither appellee was “in default or otherwise precluded from proceeding with arbitration,” and that the case was “otherwise proper for arbitration.” C.T. 192-95.

Appellants challenge the correctness of the trial court’s order in several respects. Their primary contention, however, is that arbitration is improper because (1) appellees “repudiated” the contract — by asserting, after certain partial breaches, a refusal to perform future obligations— and (2) one who repudiates a contract containing an arbitration clause may not under California law claim the benefit of that clause by requiring arbitration. We reject the second part of this argument, and hold that arbitration was properly ordered.

Admittedly, California law concerning - the question here involved is not entirely clear. Counsel have referred us to numerous decisions dealing with the right to claim arbitration. Most are distinguishable from the present case in certain respects. Several, for instance, involve situations in which an arbitration clause itself is specifically repudiated or waived by a party who later seeks to enforce arbitration. E. g., Local 659, Int’l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees v. Color Corp. of America, 47 Cal.2d 189 , 302 P.2d 294 (1956); Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 192 Cal.App.2d 268 , 13 Cal.Rptr. 446 (1961).

Most directly in point is a line of cases beginning with Hanes v. Coffee, 212 Cal. 777 , 300 P. 963 (1931), which lends support to appellants’ contentions. The Hanes case involved an oil lease con taining an arbitration clause. . Without seeking arbitration the lessor brought suit to quiet title, claiming that the lessee had failed to comply with the requirement under the agreement that work be commenced within two years. The Supreme Court of California affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, asserting the following with respect to the arbitration clause:

We note that this is all that is said on this issue, and that no authority, from either California or any other jurisdiction, is cited in support of the holding. A number of cases decided by the district courts of appeal have followed this decision in more or less analogous situations. See Stetson v. Orland Oil Syndicate, 42 Cal.App.2d 139 , 108 P.2d 463 (1940); Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal.App.2d 430 , 127 P.2d 1027 (1942); Banks v. Calstar Petroleum Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 789 , 187 P.2d 127 (1947); Drake v. Stein, 116 Cal.App.2d 779 , 254 P.2d 613 (1953); Wetsel v. Garibaldi, 159 Cal.App.2d 4 , 323 P.2d 524 (1958); Ehrhart & Associates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 185 Cal.App.2d 1 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 844 (1960).

These decisions, however, cannot be relied upon to settle the question. First, the only state supreme court decision in point is Hanes itself — which was decided thirty-six years ago; since that time considerable development has taken place elsewhere in the law concerning the repudiation of agreements to arbitrate. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 383 (1949). Pri- or to the last quarter-century the generally adhered to rule was that a repudiation of contractual obligations other than the obligation to arbitrate a controversy —as well as repudiation of the arbitration agreement itself — worked a forfeiture of the right to require arbitration. Thus, the Hanes case reflected the prevailing view at the time that case was decided. This rule was impressively criticized, however, and in 1942 the leading English case of Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356, held to the contrary, reversing English precedent. The Heyman decision has since been endorsed by several American courts. See, e. g., In re Pahlberg Petition, 131 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1942); Batter Building Materials Co. v. Kirschner, 142 Conn. 1 , 110 A.2d 464 (1954); DeLillo Constr. Co. v. Lizza & Sons, 7 N.Y.2d 102 , 195 N.Y.S.2d 825 , 164 N.E.2d 95 (1959).

The decisions following Hanes , furthermore, have been seriously undercut by a 1963 California District Court of Appeal ruling (which does not consider Hanes). In Swift-Chaplin Productions, Inc. v. Love, 219 Cal.App.2d 110 , 32 Cal.Rptr. 758 , 5 A.L.R.3d 1001 (1963), it was directly held that the termination of a contract according to its terms did not prevent subsequent arbitration according to the provisions of the agreement. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this decision conflicts to a substantial extent with the Hanes rationale, under which repudiation of a contract “terminated” the agreement, preventing the repudiator from insisting on arbitration according to its terms. And the language of recent opinions of the state supreme court, as well as various intermediate courts of appeal, indicates at least that the Heyman question is an open one in California. This conclusion is strongly suggested by the opinions in Local 659, Int’l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees v. Color Corp. of America, 47 Cal.2d 189, 194-197 , 302 P.2d 294, 296-298 (1956), and Bertero v. Superior Court, 216 Cal.App.2d 213, 221-222 , 30 Cal.Rptr. 719, 724-725 (1963). Other recent decisions indicate that loss of the right to arbitration stems only from repudiation of the agreement to arbitrate, not from repudiation of other contractual duties. See, e. g., Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 192 Cal.App.2d 268 , 13 Cal.Rptr. 446 (1961).

In this context we are faced with the difficult task of discerning the position that would presently be taken by the California courts in regard to appellants’ allegations of repudiation. As a preface to deciding this question, it is important to specify carefully the nature of the alleged renunciation. For “repudiation” is an elusive concept, and, as the researcher will find, can have various meanings, often confusing and seldom spelled out. Here, appellants do not contend that appellees have at any time waived or specifically repudiated the arbitration clause itself; indeed, the evidence suggests that appellees have consistently urged compliance with that clause. Rather, the “repudiation” here charged relates to other contractual duties. More specifically, the allegations spell out a refusal to perform contractual obligations. It is claimed that appellees (1) breached the contract in certain respects, and (2) refused to render any future performance —conduct which, in combination, is asserted to constitute a “repudiation of the contract.”

Such allegations are to be carefully distinguished from allegations of repudiation through denial of contractual responsibility. For the assertion that no contract exists is clearly deemed by California courts to include a denial of the existence of any arbitration agreement, so that one who made such an assertion would be estopped from requiring arbitration. It is upon this basis that Bertero v. Superior Court, 216 Cal.App.2d 213 , 30 Cal.Rptr. 719 (1963), much cited by counsel, actually rests. It is clear that appellees here have denied the existence neither of a contract nor, specifically, of the arbitration clause in question.

In such circumstances appellees’ insistence on arbitration should be upheld. There are several reasons to support this conclusion. First, the rule thus applied — the rule of Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd.—seems the better one. To require, before arbitration, a judicial determination of every allegation that contractual provisions have been “repudiated” would often cause the arbitral process — for which the parties freely bargained — to become valueless, with the very question at issue having already been decided by the “preliminary” judicial proceeding. At the very least, such litigation would bring about an undesirable delay where swift, informal determination had been sought. Further, the requirement cast upon the party alleging repudiation — calling only for him to submit to one method of determining issues rather than another (a method, in fact, to which he had originally agreed) — can hardly be considered oppressive. In this context, the dictum of Lord Macmillan in the Heyman decision is persuasive:

Judge Frank and Professors Corbin and Williston, as well, have offered notable criticisms of the contrary position.

A second reason to support the arbitration provision is California’s strong public policy in favor of arbitration and the authoritative language of the relevant state legislation concerning arbitration. The state courts have recognized that:

See also Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 56 Cal.2d 169 , 14 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 363 P.2d 313 (1961).

Also, according to section 1284 of the California Code of Civil Procedure (which, though now superseded, was in effect at the time the Riess-Murchison agreement was made and at the time this litigation was initiated), a stay of proceedings to allow arbitration was required in a situation such as that presented here unless the party urging the stay was “in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” Of identical language in a parallel section of the Code — former section 1282, providing for an original action to compel arbitration — the California Supreme Court stated:

We see no reason why the virtually identical terms of these two sections dealing merely with separate procedural aspects of the same problem should (or would by the California Supreme Court) be interpreted differently.

The 1961 revision of these sections appears to have changed no more than the language, insofar as their bearing on the present case is concerned. Section 1281.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure now specifies that arbitration is to be ordered unless:

The statutory provisions referred to have, of course, considerable substantive as well as procedural significance.

It is noteworthy, in addition, that at least one of the principal advantages of arbitration which California public policy thus seeks to promote — decision according to skilled arbiters with special knowledge of particular fields — will be advanced by ordering arbitration here; the question of the water lands’ capacity would appear to be one as to which technical expertise will be helpful.

In candor, we state that we are given particular pause by one contention made on behalf of appellants. They assert that appellees’ alleged refusal to perform was motivated by an expressed desire to injure them by causing delay and giving them “a belly full of litigation.” It is tempting to take the position that such conduct warrants treatment different from that accorded one who simply finds himself unable to perform his contractual obligations. Nevertheless, we do not conclude that such allegations are decisive. We have discovered no case turning on such a factor. Moreover, it would be an easy matter for any party in appellants’ position to allege that a refusal to perform was thus induced; and the litigation required in order to decide the question of motivation would undoubtedly often be substantial, so that (1) still more delay would be interjected into a context in which speedy determination according to arbitration was contemplated by the parties, and (2) judicial inquiry might well so penetrate the issues scheduled for arbitration that the arbitral process would become purposeless. We find some consolation in the fact that one of arbitration’s primary advantages is speed, so that the additional delay caused by that process in this unfortunately extended litigation should not be substantial. We conclude, then, that the California courts — which have gained a justified reputation for progressive legal craftsmanship — would resolve this difficult question by reaffirming the language of their more recent decisions and adopting the. post-Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd. approach to repudiation in the circumstances of this case.

Since appellees’ alleged repudiation is thus irrelevant to the propriety of arbitration, we need not decide the question, urged upon us by appellants, as to whether the record below would support or command a finding of repudiation. Nor need we pass upon appellants’ persuasively argued subsidiary contention, that a duty of diligent development of the water lands by appellees should be read as an implied provision of the contract.

Two further questions, with respect to the procedure and order of the district court, remain. Appellants cite Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. of Delaware v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449 , 55 S.Ct. 313 , 79 L.Ed. 583 (1935), for the proposition that the stay ordered by the district court was the equivalent of an interlocutory injunction, and argue accordingly that pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure the trial judge should have made and set out separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. This question, however — which is by no means free from difficulty — is one which this court need not decide. Our holding that arbitration is proper regardless of the alleged repudiation in this case makes completely unnecessary detailed findings of fact concerning what assertions were actually made by or on behalf of appellees. As this court noted in Yanish v. Barber, 232 F.2d 939, 947 (1956) :

A remand calling for findings of fact would here be sheer judicial waste, and cannot be countenanced.

It is contended finally by appellants that it was error for the district court to include in its order a finding that appellees were not “in default.” Appellants apparently construe this language (or fear that it might be construed) to refer to a possible “default” with respect to the substantive provisions of the contract. It seems clear to us, however, that the reference is merely to appellees’ conduct in regard to arbitration- — that is, to the absence of any action on their part which could possibly be deemed a waiver of the right to arbitration or a failure to pursue that remedy diligently. The issue of “total breach” of the contract remains untried and undecided.

Arbitration, then, is proper with respect to the sufficiency of water to service the Montgomery lands and the additional lands. On the determination of this question hinges the issue of appellees’ compliance with their conditional obligation to construct pipelines and a reservoir. The function of the arbitration is thus a narrow one, but the issue involved is an integral part of the broader question whether there has been a “total breach” — which, following arbitration, will presumably be determined judicially.

The order of the district court is affirmed.

. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 991-992 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.); 6 S. Williston, Contracts § 1921 (rev. ed. 1938). . Specifically, it is asserted that appellees failed (1) to deliver $18,000 of the $48,000 due appellants over the first two years of the contract; (2) to pay for water produced, saved, and sold; and (3) to build the agreed-upon reservoir and pipelines within two years of the contract’s consummation date. The district court upheld appellants’ contentions relating to all three breaches in its original decision. This court affirmed with respect to point (1); point (2) was apparently not specifically appealed (no ruling was rendered regarding it); and point (3), of course, now awaits arbitration. . See authorities cited note 1, supra; 6A A. Corbin. Contracts § 1443 (1962). . See present section 1281.4. . See, e.g., Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 239-242 , 73 P.2d 1163, 1166-1168 (1937); Acme Oil & Mining Co. v. Williams, 140 Cal. 681 , 74 P. 296 (1903). . Accord, Carey v. Carter, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 182 , 344 F.2d 567 (1965) (per curiam). . See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 , 75 S.Ct. 249 , 99 L.Ed. 233 (1955); Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S. 454 , 55 S.Ct. 475 , 79 L.Ed. 989 (1935). . It might be argued that the district court should hear this case before arbitration, on grounds of judicial economy. That is, the district court might conceivably hold that, regardless of whether appellees should be found to have violated their conditional obligation to construct the reservoir and pipelines, there clearly had (or had not) been a total breach; in such circumstances, runs the argument, the appellants might well decline to seek specific damages for breach of that single clause, and arbitration would thus be unnecessary. Of. Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 1281.2 (West 1967). Such reasoning can be justly criticized as overly dependent on speculation. More importantly, however, it ignores this court’s prior determination, now the law of the case, that unless their conduct has rendered it improper, “the buyers are entitled to have the question of sufficiency settled by arbitration.” 329 F.2d at 644 .