22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T482,MEMORANDUM Armida Rivera appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Rivera’s action on the basis of judicial estoppel because Rivera’s position in her complaint is clearly inconsistent with her statement in the bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court accepted her prior position in granting her a discharge. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir.2001) (setting forth the standard of review and explaining the doctrine of judicial estoppel). Accepting Rivera’s current, inconsistent position would provide her with an unfair advantage in light of the bankruptcy discharge. See id. at 782 (“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from gaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position.”). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T4af,

MEMORANDUM

Armida Rivera appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Rivera’s action on the basis of judicial estoppel because Rivera’s position in her complaint is clearly inconsistent with her statement in the bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court accepted her prior position in granting her a discharge. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir.2001) (setting forth the standard of review and explaining the doctrine of judicial estoppel). Accepting Rivera’s current, inconsistent position would provide her with an unfair advantage in light of the bankruptcy discharge. See id. at 782 (“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from gaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position.”).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.