York

Kathleen Strong appeals from an order denying her motion for postjudgment attorney fees incurred in enforcing a judgment for fees awarded for her successful defense of a SLAPP suit (strategic lawsuit against public participation) (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; all further statutory references are to this code).

Strong argues she was entitled to such a fee award pursuant to section 685.040, which authorizes an award for enforcement of judgments not only where provided for in a contract, but also in cases where such fees are “otherwise provided by law.” (§ 685.040.)

We agree. Both the language of section 685.040 and binding Supreme Court precedent require this result. We therefore reverse the order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on Strong’s motion for attorney fees.

FACTS

Strong was sued by respondent Michael G. York in a case arising out of their competing claims to share in a settlement that had been paid to a client whom York and Strong had each represented at various points in an underlying litigation. Strong filed a special motion to strike York’s complaint as a SLAPP action pursuant to section 425.16.

After the court granted Strong’s…