This case raises but one issue, the validity of a border search of appellant. In spite of her violent resistance, she was compelled to submit to a procedure whereby a medical doctor removed from her vagina two rubber packets, each about two inches in diameter, together containing 93 grams of heroin.

This court has repeatedly upheld border searches of body cavities, 1 including such searches carried out in spite of the violent resistance of the person searched. 2 However, for reasons that will appear, we do not reach such issues here. The only question we decide is whether initiation of the search was lawful.

We have repeatedly said that a border search can be undertaken without probable cause, 3 but we have also held that even in such cases, the officers must act reasonably. 4 Our recent decision in Rivas v. United States, supra, n. 1, establishes that in the case of a search of body cavities, “ ‘there must be a clear indication of the possession of narcotics,’ ” or a “plain suggestion” of the smuggling, which must be “over and beyond ‘a mere suspicion.’ ” 5 Rivas requires, when body cavities are searched, something more than was required in the earlier decisions, which said that “mere suspicion” *807 is enough. 6 The Rivas requirement is based upon language used by the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. State of California, 1966, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 .

Schmerber upheld the taking of a blood sample from a person validly arrested for drunken driving, over his objection. The court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to an invasion of the body, but that the invasion there involved was not unreasonable. In so holding, the court said:

We think that, while the language quoted deals specifically with an invasion, rather than an examination, of one’s body, its implications áre broader. The decision emphasizes that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the state.” To us, this means that every search must be examined in the light of the Amendment’s requirement that it not be “unreasonable.” And we think that this requirement applies to border searches.

This does not at all mean that border searches are not different from *808 others. On the contrary, it is too well established to require citation of authority that such searches are unique, that the mere fact that a person is crossing the border is sufficient cause for a search. Thus every person crossing our border may be required to disclose the contents of his baggage, and of his vehicle, if he has one. The mere crossing of the border is sufficient cause for such a search. Even “mere suspicion” is not required. We assume that the same rule would apply to the contents of his or her purse, wallet, or pockets. If, however, the search of the person is to go further, if the party, male or female, is to be required to strip, we think that something more, at least a real suspicion, directed specifically to that person, should be required. And if there is to be a more than casual examination of the body, if in the course of the search of a woman there is to be a requirement that she manually open her vagina for visual inspection to see if she has something concealed there, we think that we should require more than a mere suspicion. Surely, to require such a performance is a serious invasion of personal privacy and dignity, and so unlawful if “unwarranted”. Surely, in such a case, to be warranted, the official’s action should be backed by at least the “clear indication”, the “plain suggestion”, required in Schmerber and in Rivas.

We have several times taken judicial notice of the fact that narcotics are being smuggled across the border in body cavities. 9 There is testimony in this case that between December 19 of 1963 and May 2 of 1966, at the port of entry at San Ysidro, California, there were 17 seizures of narcotics found in vaginas of women crossing the border from Mexico. This number includes the present case. There was also an unknown number of cases in which a woman, confronted with the prospect of a search, voluntarily removed the narcotic from her vagina. Counsel for appellant stipulated “that this particular method of importing contraband is common and known to Agent Maxcy.” We recognize that this presents a serious problem of law enforcement, to be weighed against the individual’s right to human dignity and privacy as protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 1957, 352 U.S. 432, 439-440 , 77 S.Ct. 408 , 1 L.Ed.2d 448 .

On the other hand, the record does not show how many women who crossed the border during the same time were subjected to similar searches as a result of which nothing was found. We can also take judicial notice that many thousands of women crossed the border during the same period, and that the vast majority were not carrying narcotics in their body cavities or elsewhere. Agent Maxcy testified that he could not even make an accurate estimate of the number of women who had crossed the border during that period. He agreed that it would be absurd for him to attempt to say. These women are certainly entitled to their dignity and privacy; their interests, too, are to be weighed. That is why we think that the Schmerber test should be applied to the inspection to which appellant was subjected.

Appellant crossed the border in an automobile driven by one Banks. The customs officers had not received any information in relation to the car or to Banks or to appellant that would alert them to the possibility that they might be carrying narcotics. Such information did exist in Denton, Blefare and Witt, supra, n. 1. Neither appellant nor Banks was a known user of narcotics, or required to register as a person convicted of a narcotics offense, as in Murgia and Rivas, supra, n. 1. Neither was under the influence of narcotics, nor did either bear the needle marks on the arms that characterize users, as was the case in Blackford, Blefare and Rivas, supra, n. 1. Neither did either of them do or say anything to arouse suspicion, so far as *809 appears. The agents had not been told, by appellant or anyone else, that appellant had anything concealed in her body, as was the case in Blackford and Murgia, supra, n. 1.

The government, on the motion to suppress, did not call Customs Inspector Trumble, who was on duty when the car crossed the border, and stopped the car. It appears by hearsay testimony of another agent, Maxcy, that Trumble, who is described as an experienced agent, ranked “at least number one or number two in the apprehension of narcotic violators at the Port of Entry,” “believed that he had seen, stopped and caused to be searched Mrs. Henderson on the previous occasion, at which time a gun, a small quantity of dangerous drugs, and a marijuana cigarette were found in her purse.” This was about three or four weeks before. Trumble’s recollection was based upon appellant’s appearance, not her name. We do not know whether this was what caused him to ask her to leave the car and go to the office, or whether he first thought he recognized her when she was in the office. But it is conceded that this recollection was the sole reason for his having Inspectress Lohman, a woman, search appellant.

Mrs. Lohman took appellant to a windowless room, required her to strip, made a visual examination of her body and demanded that she bend over and, with her hands pull her buttocks apart and up to permit inspection of her vagina. Lohman testified that appellant did not cooperate in a manner permitting the inspection. She concluded that appellant was concealing something in her vagina. She found no marks on appellant’s body, nor anything, such as vaseline, around her vagina. Appellant was naked for 5 or 6 minutes.

It was on the basis of Trumble’s recollection and of Lohman’s opinion that agent Maxcy had appellant taken to a doctor where a search, after a struggle, resulted in discovery of the heroin.

Trumble’s recollection was in error, however, and there was at hand a means whereby the error could easily have been found. Agent Maxcy, after he arranged to have a further search made by a doctor, ran appellant’s name through the customs files, and found out that Trum-ble’s recollection was in error. This took 15 minutes.

We think that where, as here, a search such as Inspectress Lohman carried out is to be made, where suspicion on the part of the agent is based solely upon recollection of a prior event, somewhat removed in time, to which the woman to be searched is connected solely by recollection of physical appearance, where the means of verification is readily at hand but not used, and where the incident recalled did not involve use of a body cavity, there does not exist the “clear indication,” the “plain suggestion,” that Schmerber and Rivas require. At most, there is mere suspicion, which is not enough, It follows that Lohman’s search violated appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 10

We think, too, that in this case the subsequent search, by the doctor, is *810 “fruit of the poisonous tree.” 11 It is clear that the latter search was made primarily, if not solely, because Lohman’s search led her to believe that appellant was carrying something in her vagina. Maxcy, who authorized it, testified:

We do not overlook the fact that Maxcy also found in appellant’s purse, before he ordered the further search, “a registration slip for an automobile made out in the name of ‘Otis Lee Kimble’ which is a name of, that is well known to myself and our Service.” As to Kimble, Maxcy also said:

While Maxcy, in response to a somewhat leading question, said that he arranged *811 for the further search “as a result of the various information that * * * [he] had,” it is apparent that he relied primarily on what Lohman told him. And what she knew she learned from an unwarranted search. Thus the subsequent search was an “exploitation of that illegality.” 12

The judgment of conviction is reversed.

. Blackford v. United States, 9 Cir., 1957, 247 F.2d 745 (male, rectum); In re Woods, 9 Cir., 1957, 249 F.2d 614 , denying certificate of probable cause in Application of Woods, N.D.Cal.1957, 154 F. Supp. 932 (male, rectum); Murgia v. United States, 9 Cir., 1960, 285 F.2d 14 (male, rectum); Denion v. United States, 9 Cir., 1962, 310 F.2d 129 (male, rectum) ; Blefare v. United States, 9 Cir., 1966, 362 F.2d 870 (male, stomach); Rivas v. United States, 9 Cir., 1966, 368 F.2d 703 (male, rectum); see also King v. United States, 5 Cir., 1958, 258 F.2d 754 , affirming United States v. Michel, S.D. Tex., 1957, 158 F.Supp. 34 (male, stomach). Cf. Witt v. United States, 9 Cir., 1961, 287 F.2d 389 (female; narcotic in brassiere).

. Blackford v. United States, supra, n. 1; Denton v. United States, supra, n. 1; Blefare v. United States, supra, n. 1; Rivas v. United States, supra, n. 1; Application of Woods, supra, n. 1.

. See cases cited, n. 1, supra.

. Blackford v. United States, supra, n. 1, 247 F.2d at p. 751 ; Denton v. United States, supra, n. 1, 310 F.2d at p. 132 .

. Rivas v. United States, supra, n. 1, 368 F.2d at p. 710 .

. See Blefare v. United States, supra, n. 1, 362 F.2d at p. 875 ; cf. Witt v. United States, supra, n. 1, 287 F.2d at p. 391 .

. Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 1949, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 .

. Mapp v. Ohio, 1961, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 .

. Blackford v. United States, supra, n. 1, 247 F.2d at p. 752 ; Denton v. United States, supra, n. 1, 310 F.2d at p. 132 ; Blefare v. United States, supra, n. 1, 362 F.2d at p. 874 ; Rivas v. United States, supra, n. 1, 368 F.2d at p. 709 .

. The trial judge upheld the search. He relied entirely upon Trumble’s identification:

We agree with the principle, but disagree with the application. We note that the finding of good faith on Trumble’s part is based solely upon hearsay. There is no explanation of why Trumble was not called by the government after appellant made a prima facie showing. Who but he could demonstrate his own bona fides?

. Wong Sun v. United States, 1963, 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 .

. Wong Sun, supra, n. 11 , 371 U.S. at p. 488 . 83 S.Ct. 407 .