MEMORANDUM

Ronald Bruce Ellis appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of his arrest and subsequent conviction and imprisonment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003) (dismissal under Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)®). We reverse and remand.

We are unable to determine from the complaint that Ellis filed whether some of his claims might be cognizable under § 1983. Ellis should be given the opportunity on remand to clarify his constitutional claims and explain what facts support them. If clarified, the district court may still determine that Rooker-Feldman is properly invoked as to some of Ellis’ allegations.

The district court erred in dismissing Ellis’ entire action for lack of subject mat-., ter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine because Ellis’ action complained of illegal acts and omissions by defendants, at least some of which do not allege an error by the state court and therefore do not constitute a de facto appeal. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 (explaining that Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction over an action in which a federal plaintiff complains of a legal injury caused by an adverse party); see. also Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2004) (“Rooker-Feldman ... applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as ... [his] injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as ... [his] remedy relief from the state court judgment.”).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.