22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4ae,MEMORANDUM Terrance Earl Horton appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 46-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm. Horton contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his mitigating circumstances, and because the government’s delay in prosecuting him until after he was sentenced in state court increased his criminal history score and precluded him from requesting that the state court run his state and federal sentences concurrently. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Horton’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 , 128 S.Ct. 586 , 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The low-end sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3558 (a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Horton’s violent criminal history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 , 128 S.Ct. 586 . AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T4db,

MEMORANDUM

Terrance Earl Horton appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 46-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

Horton contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his mitigating circumstances, and because the government’s delay in prosecuting him until after he was sentenced in state court increased his criminal history score and precluded him from requesting that the state court run his state and federal sentences concurrently. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Horton’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 , 128 S.Ct. 586 , 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The low-end sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3558 (a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Horton’s violent criminal history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 , 128 S.Ct. 586 .

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.