Jonathon Castro v. County of Los Angeles

Opinion by Judge GILMAN; Concurrence by Judge CALLAHAN; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge GRABER.

OPINION

In October 2009, Jonathan Castro was arrested for being drunk in public. He was housed in a “sobering cell” at the Los Angeles Sheriffs West Hollywood Station where, a few hours after his arrest, he was savagely attacked by another intoxicated arrestee who had been placed in the cell with him. The officer on duty at the jail failed to respond to Castro’s pounding on the cell door despite evidence that the officer was well within range to hear the pounding. Castro suffered serious harm, including a broken jaw and traumatic brain injury.

This lawsuit was filed by Castro in the United States District Court for the Central District of California in July 2010. He brought both federal- and state-law claims against the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, and a number of John Doe defendants who were later identified as two of his jailers. After a six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Castro against both the individual and entity defendants, awarding him over $2.6 million in past and future damages.

The defendants then renewed…

concurring:

I agree with the majority that the judgment of the district court against the individual defendants should be affirmed and the judgment against the County reversed. I write separately to explain that I do not think that Castro has shown that the design of the West Hollywood Station constitutes a policy for purposes of liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978),

I do not deny that pursuant to Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 , 106 S.Ct. 1292 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), the design of a jail in some circumstances, might be held to' constitute a deliberate choice or policy. However, I disagree with *357 the suggestion that the fact that the jail was constructed is sufficient in itself to “meet the definition of a formal municipal policy.” Maj. at 23. Rather, I agree with the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 246 (6th Cir.1988), that “Pembaur [ ] requirefs] proof, of a deliberate and discernible city policy to maintain ... inadequately designed and equipped jails; not mere speculation that such matters are ‘inherently matters of city policy.’…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I join the majority opinion, with the exception of Part D.2. I respectfully dissent from the holding that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the entity Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk that Plaintiff would be harmed by a fellow inmate.

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), the Supreme Court acknowledged that “considerable conceptual difficulty would attend any search for the subjective state of mind of a governmental entity, as distinct from that of a governmental official.” This case squarely presents that considerable conceptual difficulty.

We previously have acknowledged that certain types of evidence could show that an entity possesses subjective knowledge:

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175 , 1188 n. 10 (9th Cir.2002). But those two types of evidence are not the only kinds of evidence that can show such knowledge. Here, as the majority explains, state regulations applicable to the County identify the risk of the precise harm that befell Plaintiff in this case and mandate a particular audio-monitoring system in order…

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JONATHAN MICHAEL CASTRO, No. 12-56829 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. v. 2:10-05425-DSF

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS

ANGELES SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; OPINION

CHRISTOPHER SOLOMON; DAVID

VALENTINE, Sergeant, aka Valentine, Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 11, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed May 1, 2015

Before: Ronald Lee Gilman,* Susan P. Graber, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gilman; Concurrence by Judge Callahan; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Graber

* The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment, entered following a jury trial, in an action brought under federal and state law by a pretrial detainee who was attacked by another arrestee and suffered…