United States v. Luis Pulido

MEMORANDUM

To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of speedy trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a court must first determine whether “the interval' between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)).

Once the defendant makes a showing of presumptively prejudicial delay, the court must weigh four factors: (1) “the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim,” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 ; (2) “the reason the government assigns to justify the delay,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; (3) “[wjhether and how [the] defendant asserts his right ...,” id.; and (4) “prejudice to the defendant,” id. at 532 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 .

After concluding that the presumption of prejudice may have been triggered in this case, the district court weighed only two of the Barker factors: the prejudice to the defendant and the length of delay. The district…