Ronald Porter v. Donald C. Winter
Opinion
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Ronald L. Porter appeals pro se from the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in his employment action alleging retaliation and gender dis crimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.
The record supports the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (“the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee”); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501 (e) (an award of reasonable attorney’s fees allowable only for “services performed ... after the filing of a written complaint, provided that the attorney provides reasonable notice of representation to the agency ..., except that fees are allowable for a reasonable period of time prior to the notification of representation for any services performed in reaching a determination to represent the complainant”); see also Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-38 , 111 S.Ct. 1435 , 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991) (pro se plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees). Contrary to Porter’s contentions, the district court reviewed de novo the administrative award of attorney’s fees and costs.