State Department of State Hospitals v. Superior Court

In 2007, Gilton Pitre was paroled from state prison. Before his release, the State Department of Mental Health (DMH) assessed *344 whether he should be civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). Ultimately, the Director of Mental Health did not request a petition for commitment and Pitre left prison. Four days later, he raped and murdered plaintiff Elaina Novoa’s 15-year-old sister, Alyssa Gomez.

Plaintiff sued DMH and two of its acting directors, claiming the death was caused by defendants’ failure to discharge mandatory duties imposed by the SVPA. The superior court overruled a demurrer. Defendants petitioned for a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, and concluded that while the SVPA imposed a mandatory duty on defendants, the alleged breach was not the proximate cause of Gomez’s death. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The SVPA

The SVPA authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person who has completed a prison term but is found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). (Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 646 [ 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 410 , 304 P.3d 1071 ]; People v.…

Concurring. — I concur in the court’s decision affirming the Court of Appeal’s judgment ordering the superior court to sustain *358 defendants’ demurrers to plaintiff’s first and second causes of action. I do so, however, on narrower grounds than the majority. The majority holds plaintiff’s allegations of proximate cause are both legally insufficient as to cause in fact and in contravention of public policies involving discretionary governmental decisions. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 355-357.) I agree with the first conclusion but not the second.

I

In a typical personal injury action, where the causal relationship between the breach of duty and the injury is relatively plain, “it suffices to plead causation succinctly and generally.” (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 78 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 846 , 980 P.2d 398 ].) “But when, by contrast, ‘ “the pleaded facts of negligence and injury do not naturally give rise to an inference of causation[,] the plaintiff must plead specific facts affording an inference the one caused the others.” ’ [Citation.] That is, the plaintiff must allege facts, albeit as succinctly as possible, explaining how the conduct caused or…

I. BACKGROUND

A. The SVPA The SVPA authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person who has completed a prison term but is found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). (Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 646 (Reilly); People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1185 (McKee).) The SVPA‘s purposes are ― ‗to protect the public from dangerous felony offenders with mental disorders and to provide mental health treatment for their disorders.‘ ‖ (McKee, at p. 1203.) The Welfare and Institutions Code sets forth the relevant procedures. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)1 Section 6600, subdivision (a)(1) defines an SVP as ―a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.‖ 2 ―Whenever the Director of Corrections determines that an individual who is in custody . . . may be [an SVP], the director shall . . . refer the person for evaluation . . . .‖ (Former § 6601, subd. (a)(1).)3 The statutory scheme establishes a multiple-level review for…