Banks

In 1990, the voters passed Proposition 115, which adopted a wide range of criminal justice reforms, including extending death penalty eligibility to “major participants]” in felony murders. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (d) (section 190.2(d)), added by initiative, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) Prop. 115, § 10; see Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 342-345 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 326 , 801 P.2d 1077 ].) The issue before us is under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a major participant so as to be statutorily eligible for the death penalty.

Section 190.2(d) was designed to codify the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 127 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 ], which articulates the constitutional limits on executing felony murderers who did not personally kill. Tison and a prior decision on which it is based, Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 ], collectively place conduct on a spectrum, with felony-murder participants eligible for death only when their involvement is substantial and they demonstrate a reckless indifference to the grave risk of death created by their actions. Section…