Anatoly Valushkin v. Loretta E. Lynch
Opinion
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Anatoly Valushkin petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s decision. The immigration judge denied Valushkin’s applications for a § 212(h) waiver, adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and voluntary departure. The BIA affirmed and then denied a motion to remand. We deny the petition.
Valushkin argues that the BIA erred when it determined that he was removable because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude — namely, a Hobbs Act conviction for interference with commerce by threats or violence, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 . The BIA has long held that extortion constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Matter of C-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 370 (BIA 1953). “[W]here, as here, the [BIA] determines that certain conduct” — ie., extortion — “is morally turpitudinous in a precedential decision, we apply Chevron deference regardless of whether the order under review is the precedential decision itself or a subsequent unpublished order that relies upon it.” Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc). We are…