22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4fb,MEMORANDUM Chandrama Mishra appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action alleging a claim related to his appointment and pay for a position with the Department of Veterans Affairs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Mangano v. United States, 529 F.3d 1243 , 1245 n. 2 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Mishra’s action because it is precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”). See id. at 1247-48 (CSRA limits federal employees challenging “prohibited personnel practices,” defined as any “personnel action” taken for an improper motive, to an administrative remedial system (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302 )); Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1991) (broadly construing the definition of “personnel action”). The district court properly denied Mish-ra’s motion for default judgment because defendants filed a timely response to his complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(2), (3), and (4); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986) (setting forth standard of review). AFFIRMED. The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).24:T52d,

MEMORANDUM

Chandrama Mishra appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action alleging a claim related to his appointment and pay for a position with the Department of Veterans Affairs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Mangano v. United States, 529 F.3d 1243 , 1245 n. 2 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Mishra’s action because it is precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”). See id. at 1247-48 (CSRA limits federal employees challenging “prohibited personnel practices,” defined as any “personnel action” taken for an improper motive, to an administrative remedial system (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302 )); Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1991) (broadly construing the definition of “personnel action”).

The district court properly denied Mish-ra’s motion for default judgment because defendants filed a timely response to his complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(2), (3), and (4); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986) (setting forth standard of review).

AFFIRMED.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).