Blackburn

Concurring. — The court holds that when a trial court errs in completely denying a mentally disordered offender (MDO) the right to a jury trial under Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (a), the error requires automatic reversal. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1136.) In a companion case filed today, we adopt the same reversal rule when a trial court errs in denying a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) the right to a jury trial under Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b). (People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163 [ 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251 , 354 P.3d 148 ] (Tran).)

The Chief Justice dissents from these holdings, observing that “as a general matter” article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution (section 13) as *1138 interpreted in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] (Watson) authorizes reversal of a judgment only upon a finding of prejudice. (Cone. & dis. opn., post, at p. 1146; see Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1173 (cone. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.).) Of course, the qualifier is all-important here. The court’s opinions today do not dispute that the Watson standard applies as a general matter, they instead conclude that…

Concurring and Dissenting. — I concur in the statutory interpretation in parts I through III of the majority opinion. But I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the opinion concerning the standard of harmless error review applicable to the state law errors that occurred in this case and the proper application of that standard. Unlike the federal Constitution, which contains no provision addressing the subject of harmless error in a judicial proceeding, the California Constitution contains an explicit provision directed to that subject, providing that “[n]o judgment shall be set aside ... for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 (hereafter article VI, section 13).) Notwithstanding this explicit state constitutional provision generally eschewing the application of an automatic or reversible per se harmless error standard to state law error, today’s opinion, for the first time, holds that an automatic reversal rule should apply to the trial court’s failure to advise a…

Filed 8/17/15 (this opn. precedes companion case, S211329, also filed 8/17/15)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

) Plaintiff and Respondent, ) S211078 ) v. ) ) Ct.App. 6 H037207

BRUCE LEE BLACKBURN, )

) Santa Clara County Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. BB304666 ____________________________________)

The statutory scheme for extending the involuntary commitment of a mentally disordered offender (hereafter sometimes MDO) beyond termination of parole requires the trial court to ―advise the person of his or her right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a jury trial‖ and to hold a jury trial ―unless waived by both the person and the district attorney.‖ (Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (a) (hereafter section 2972(a)).) We granted review to decide whether a trial court must advise the defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and whether the trial court must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant before…

The statutory scheme for extending the involuntary commitment of a mentally disordered offender (hereafter sometimes MDO) beyond termination of parole requires the trial court to “advise the person of his or her right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a jury trial” and to hold a jury trial “unless waived by both the person and the district attorney.” (Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (a) (hereafter section 2972(a)).) We granted review to decide whether a trial court must advise the defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and whether the trial court must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant before holding a bench trial to extend the defendant’s commitment as a mentally disordered offender.

We conclude that the trial court must advise the MDO defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence — that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt — that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver…