(dissenting) :

Contrary to the impression left by the majority, the evidence which it holds admissible was obtained by searches and seizures which flagrantly violated basic provisions of the Philippine Constitution borrowed directly from the Fourth Amendment. 1 The warrants were not issued “upon probable cause.” 2 Moreover, they were general warrants, containing no language “particularly describing the * * * things to be seized.” 3 In suppressing the evidence the Supreme Court of the Philippines said, “To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution. * * *” Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 Phil.Sup.Ct.Rpts.Ann. 383, 392 (1967). 4 It is clear that the raids would be equally lawless under the Fourth Amendment. 5

The majority concludes that the evidence is nonetheless admissible in federal court because it was seized by foreign officials, to whom the Fourth Amendment does not apply, 6 and was turned over to United States agents “on a silver platter.” Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 , 69 S.Ct. 1372 , 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949).

Under the “silver platter” doctrine, evidence seized by state officers in violation of Fourth Amendment standards was, until the decision of Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), 7 admissible in a federal trial court unless the purpose of the search was to obtain evidence of a federal offense (Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 , 48 S.Ct. 137 , 72 *748 L.Ed. 293 , 52 A.L.R. 1381 (1927)); or unless federal officers participated in the search. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 , 69 S.Ct. 1372 , 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 , 47 S.Ct. 248 , 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927).

Assuming that the “silver platter” doctrine governs this case, 8 it is misapplied by the majority.

As will be noted in greater detail later, the district court made no finding as to the purpose of the raids; the applicability of the Gambino rule to this case therefore cannot be determined on the present record.

In dealing with the issue of American participation in the raids, the majority has resurrected a misconception regarding this aspect of the “silver platter” doctrine which the Supreme Court laid to rest in Lustig v. United States, supra.

The majority repeatedly asserts the view that the evidence here is admissible unless the federal agents so substantially participated in the raids as to convert them into “joint ventures” between the United States and Philippine officials. In short, the majority holds that federal officers may participate in undertakings violative of Fourth Amendment standards so long as they do not participate too much.

This view is apparently derived from a misreading of Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 , 47 S.Ct. 248 (1927). There, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied where “the search in substance and effect was a joint operation of the local and federal officers.” 273 U.S. at 33 , 47 S.Ct. at 250 . But the quoted language is simply a description of the facts in Byars , not a formulation of the general standard to be applied in determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in all cases. 9 If this was not clear in Byars itself, the Supreme Court made it so in Lustig .

The sole issue in Lustig was the interpretation and application of Byars , which the Third Circuit had read as the majority of this court reads it. 10 Reversing, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:

Justice Frankfurter later explained that under the doctrine, the “question has always been whether the offending search or seizure was conducted in any part by federal officers or in the interest of the Federal Government, or whether it was conducted solely by state officers acting exclusively for state purposes.” 364 U.S. at 236 , 80 S.Ct. at 1455 (emphasis added). 11

The inquiry must focus on what the federal officers did, since only they are subject to the Fourth Amendment. 12 If the raids were conducted in part by federal officials, acting as such, the evidence seized must be excluded. This is the legal standard, and not whether the search or seizure was a “joint operation”—a conception to which there is no reference in Lustig. 13

Accepting the findings of the district court, as supplemented by the majority of this court, 14 the American agents contributed to the unlawful enterprise in at least these respects: They brought Spielman and his information 15 to the attention of the Philippine authorities, and, as the majority finds, “finally persuaded” Spielman to meet with them. Chandler made his home available to the NBI for meetings with Spielman, and for the “planning” and “preparation” of the raids. Chandler attended these meetings. 16 In the course of “relaying in *750 formation” from Spielman to the NBI, Chandler prepared a diagram and a memorandum of two of the premises to be raided. 17 Chandler suggested an additional location to be raided; and his suggestion was adopted. 18 Chandler, prior to the raids, “secured permission from Colonel Lukban to examine and copy records seized in the raids.” After the raids hqd begun, Chandler and his two assistants, at Colonel Lukban’s request, went to one of the premises being searched, and “pointed out” the “significant” books and records to be seized. 19 From this search location the three American agents, on théir own initiative, went to another. There Chandler inquired whether the NBI agents had found a records storage room which Spielman had mentioned, and upon discovering that they had not, Chandler pointed out the location of the storage room to the NBI agent in charge. 20

*751 The majority’s conclusion that these acts do not constitute “participation” in the search by American agents within the meaning of the “silver platter” doctrine does not rest entirely upon its adoption of the erroneous “joint operation” standard of participation. A second misconception of law contributes significantly to the result. The majority asserts that “[a]ll activities of United States agents in connection with the raids took place before the raids commenced or after their termination”—and this the majority identifies as one of the “principal factors” leading to its conclusion of lack of “participation.” Since it is established by the majority’s own version of the facts that the American agents were involved in events preceding and following the initial physical intrusion upon the raided premises, it is evident that the majority uses the word “raids” in this highly restricted sense.

The Supreme Court expressly rejected this approach to the application of the silver platter doctrine in Lustig . As Justice Frankfurter said “search is a functional, not merely a physical process. Search is not completed until effective appropriation as part of an uninterrupted transaction, is made of illicitly obtained objects for subsequent proof of an offense.” He concluded that, “It is immaterial whether a federal agent originated the idea or joined in it while the search was in progress. So long as he was in it before the object of the search was completely accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in it.” 338 U.S. at 78, 79 , 69 S.Ct. at 1374 .

Thus, in determining whether the American agents participated in the searches and seizures, the enterprise must be viewed as a functional whole. The contributions which the American agents made, before the raids, in selecting places to be searched and things to be seized, cannot be treated as unrelated to the total enterprise. Neither can the conduct of our agents, after the raids had begun, in examining records, selecting and segregating significant material for seizure, and consulting with and advising NBI agents in the conduct of the searches; these acts were clearly an integral part of the “effective appropriation” of the illicitly seized evidence. 21

In light of this conduct of the American agents, it is of no consequence that they may have “objected to the raids.” Officials of our government are obliged to adhere to the Constitution; it is not enough that they violate its limitations reluctantly.

This is the point of central importance. Because our government “is entirely a creature of the Constitution,” 22 it is bound to respect the limitations which the Constitution imposes upon its powers, whether it acts at home or abroad. 23 Because the United States, acting through its agents, 24 participated in searches and seizures which were in flagrant violation of the Fourth Amend *752 ment, the evidence acquired should be suppressed. 25

Even if this were not so, reversal would be required on a second, independent ground — the inadequacy of the trial court’s findings. The majority has undertaken to fill the gaps by de novo fact-finding of its own; this an appellate court may not do. The only proper course is to remand the case to the trial court for further consideration and the entry of adequate findings. 26

One example has been mentioned earlier — the district court made no finding as to whether or not one purpose of the raids was to obtain evidence for use in an American tax prosecution. Indeed, the trial court’s findings appear deliberately to avoid the issue. 27 The majority opinion, on the other hand, flatly asserts that “the purpose of the raids was to uncover violations of Philippine law, not to obtain evidence for the United States agents”; and again, that “[t]he sole purpose of the raids was to obtain evidence for Philippine proceedings” (emphasis added).

The majority makes this finding in the face of substantial evidence to the contrary. Indeed, a Philippine official who participated in the raids testified directly that the Philippine authorities “were actually cooperating with [the Americans] for their tax case. Our interest was mainly on the involvement of politicians in possible wrongdoings in that country.” He testified that he was told by Chandler just before the raids “that we needed to get all the vouchers, accounting forms, books of account, that may help them in this tax case.” He further testified that his Philippine superior indicated, in advance of the raids, that “whatever we could get by forms or accounting forms and vouchers that might help the United States should be shown to them.” There was, in addition, an abundance of circumstantial evidence *753 that one of the purposes of the raids was to obtain evidence for an American tax prosecution. 28

It is, of course, the exclusive function of the trial court to resolve the conflict between this evidence and that upon which the majority presumably bases its finding. Since the issue may well be determinative, 29 remand is required.

There are many other instances of de novo fact-finding scattered through the majority’s account of the activities of the American agents. A few examples will suffice.

The majority finds that “Chandler did not assist in planning the raids”; the trial court found only that the raids were not “instigated” by Chandler or other United States officials. The majority’s finding ignores the evidence of Chandler’s participation in the numerous planning meetings which preceded the raids, 30 his selection of one of the locations to be raided, 31 and his preparation of the diagram and memorandum identifying places to be searched and types of documents to be seized. 32

The majority finds that this diagram and memorandum “inadvertently fell into *754 the hands of the NBI,” and “were not intended as directions to the NBI”; the district court found only that these documents “thereafter came into the possession of” the NBI. The evidence may support the trial court’s carefully limited finding; it does not support the finding of the majority. 33

The district court made no findings at all with respect to the two visits by the American agents to raided premises in the course of the search. The majority’s version of these incidents is based entirely upon the testimony of Chandler and one of his assistants. It does not fully reflect even that testimony which, with other evidence, is inconsistent with the majority’s finding denigrating the significance of these events. 34 This intervention by the majority in the fact-finding process may be of particular significance since the trial court apparently shared the majority’s misapprehension that these events were irrelevant, and, freed of that error, might well have found from the evidence that this conduct by the American agents exceeded permissible limits.

At the very least, therefore, reconsideration by the trial court is plainly required.

. Phil.Const. Art. III, § 1(3).

. The applications for the warrants stated that the articles to be seized “are being used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony, to wit: Violation of the Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code” (a description covering about 1,000 offenses), and that the place to be searched “has been observed to be the meeting place o'r accommodation office where various individuals meet in connection with illegal transactions for the purpose of defrauding the government.” A few added that “the same has also been observed as the place where illegally imported cigarette papers are being cut and kept with the Chambon Slitter Machine.”

As the Supreme Court of the Philippines held, “it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause,” for there was no showing that the parties against whom the warrants were sought-had “performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts * * *." Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 Phil.Sup.Ct.Rpts.Ann. 383, 391-92 (1967).

. The warrants authorized the seizure at each of the 32 premises raided of all “documents and/or papers showing all business transactions.”

The Philippine Supreme Court condemned this sweeping authorization as “openly contravening the explicit command of our Bills of Rights—that the things to be seized be particularly described—as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.” 20 Phil.Sup.Ct.Rpts.Ann. at 393.

. The sweeping and indiscriminate manner in which the warrants were executed sustains the court’s judgment. Two hundred agents of the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation occupied 32 separate premises, rummaged through private and business files for more than 12 hours, and trucked away thousands of documents.

. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 , 85 S.Ct. 506 , 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-196 , 48 S.Ct. 74 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-630 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) ; Saylor v. United States, 374 F.2d 894, 898 , 179 Ct.Cl. 151 (1967); Powell v. Zuckert, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 55 , 366 F.2d 634, 640 (1966).

. Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 1965).

. In Elkins , the Court, relying on its supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in federal courts, held that any evidence illegally seized by state officers is inadmissible in a federal prosecution.

. It may be argued that Elkins requires suppression of evidence in a federal court whenever the evidence was seized in a search which would have violated the Fourth Amendment if conducted by federal officials. In Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967), though, we rejected this result when dealing with a search conducted by foreign officials. It has been said that Brulay considered only the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule and that the result there was inconsistent with other bases for the rule. See Ninth Circuit Review, 10 Ariz.L.Rev. 235, 273-74 (1968) ; 53 Cornell L.Rev. 886, 892-896 (1968); 46 Texas L.Rev. 791 , 793-95 (1968). It may also be that Brulay should not be applied where, as here, the search violated local law as well as Fourth Amendment standards.

. The same is true of the similar language in Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1966). We went on to adopt the rule in Lustig v. United States, quoted hereinafter.

. Like the majority, the Third Circuit relied on the statement in Byars that “mere participation in a state search of one who is a federal officer does not render it a federal undertaking.” 273 U.S. at 32 , 47 S.Ct. at 249 . See United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1947). In context, this statement means only that participation in a state search by a federal officer does not make the enterprise a federal undertaking if the federal officer was not acting as such. The next paragraph of the Byars opinion begins:

The Court went on to say:

. Justice Frankfurter was dissenting from the Court’s rejection of the “silver platter” doctrine. The Elkins majority did not quarrel with Justice Frankfurter’s statement of the true limits of that doctrine.

See also Euziere v. United States, 266 F.2d 88, 90 (10th Cir. 1959): “The test in all cases is did the federal authorities participate in any way in the search?” (emphasis added).

. This is the premise of the Brulay and Birdsell decisions, note 6, supra, upon which the majority relies.

. Little is to he gained from the kind of case-by-case factual comparisons the majority has undertaken since each case must be determined on its own facts. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 , 47 S.Ct. 248 (1927). Moreover, it is evident from the majority’s recitations that in those lower court cases in which no participation was found, there was less federal involvement than is present here, even assuming that those decisions faithfully reflected the Supreme Court holdings in Byars and Lustig. It has been pointed out that niggardly and reluctant administration of the Byars-Lustig rule by some lower courts imposed impossible evidentiary burdens (even more formidable in a foreign search) upon the victims of searches and seizures, and tempted federal and state officials to collusion and deceit. Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later, 43 Minn.L.Rev. 1083, 1165-96 (1959). The inevitable consequence was the holding in Elkins that evidence unconstitutionally seized by state officers must be excluded from federal prosecutions without regard to whether federal officers participated in any way.

. As will be noted later, the district court made no findings with respect to some of these occurrences, and made materially different findings than the majority of this court does with respect to others. The majority’s version, however, reflects the minimum participation by American agents which could be justified by the evidence, and is therefore accepted for the purposes of the argument here.

. The value of Spielman’s information was reflected in Chandler’s statement that without it the Philippine authorities had nothing.

. Chandler testified that 10 or 12 meetings were held, and that he attended “most” of them. Chandler described his role in these meetings as that of a “mediator” between Spielman and the NBI agents, and testified that he tried “to express [to the NBI] what Spielman was trying to tell them.” During this period Chandler, who had been assigned an NBI *750 liaison, also met with officials of the NBI in their offices and his own, sometimes once or twice a day. Chandler testified that all of these meeting's concerned the investigation of appellants’ affairs; and that among the matters discussed was “the location of documents and records in the premises which were going to he raided.”

. On their face, these documents disclose detailed information as to places to be searched and things to be seized. Chandler identiifed much of the writing as his own. Chandler testified that these documents were “probably” prepared and given to Spielman to assist the latter in transmitting the information they contained to the NBI and that he presumed that this information “would probably be used in the raids.” The testimony of other witnesses indicates that the course the raiders took conformed to the suggestions in these exhibits.

. Chandler testified that he examined some of the documents seized at this location and found them to be “the type of thing we would be interested in.”

. The majority’s pallid and somewhat misleading description of this occurrence should be compared with Chandler’s own testimony, on which it is based.

Chandler testified that Colonel Lukban told him that an NBI agent “had run into a big area of records and he didn’t know what—he was not qualified to determine what he should take and what he should-n’t take, and he asked me if I would help him—if myself and the men would go down there and look at the records and see what should be taken and what should be left behind.”

Chandler and the two IBS agents “wanted to cooperate with” Lukban and therefore went with an NBI agent to the premises where the records had been found. Upon arriving, the three agents did not merely point out the apparently significant books and records at the warehouse and leave, as the majority suggests. Chandler testified that for about half an hour he and his two agents “went through the records and segregated what we thought might be important, and * * * put them in a box.” After placing the records in a box, the American agents “indicated to the [NBI] agent that that is all we could see was of any significance.”

Having done this, the agents did not simply leave, as the majority’s statement implies. The majority omits to mention that Chandler, acting on information Spielman had supplied, then examined bobbins of cigarette paper in the warehouse which he thought might be significant in the investigation. Chandler, who was accompanied by the NBI agent in charge, testified:

. Again, in the majority opinion, some of the flavor of the incident has been lost in the telling.

Chandler testified that after leaving the first search location, he and his two agents went to the main office of the United States Tobacco Corp. to see whether NBI activity there was “equally disorganized.” Chandler entered this building, and the NBI agent in charge there was brought to him. Chandler testified:

Chandler testified that he then showed the NBI agent where the record storage room was located.

The majority omits to mention that NBI agents subsequently entered the room identified by Chandler and removed the records, and that a witness testified that Chandler accompanied the NBI agents into the room, although Chandler denied it.

. Moreover, the uncontradicted testimony established that it was not until several hours after these events that the NBI loaded the fruits of the raids into trucks and left the two premises involved.

. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 , 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1225 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957).

. Id.; see Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 , 80 S.Ct. 297 , 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 , 14 L.Ed. 75 (1852); Saylor v. United States, 374 F.2d 894, 898-901 , 179 Ct.Cl. 151 (1967); Powell v. Zuckert, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 55 , 366 F.2d 634, 639-640 (1966). See also Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950).

. It is clear that the American agents acted throughout in their official capacities; there is no claim to the contrary.

. The caveats in note 2 of the majority opinion are without substance. The issue of standing was expressly reserved by the district court and is not before us. With all due respect, appellee’s “impeachment” argument, which calls for an indiscriminate extension of the limited rule of Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), is frivolous. There is little more substance to the suggestion that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because this is a civil case. Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938), relying upon Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 , 24 A.L.R. 1426 (1920), is directly in point. Illegally seized evidence may not be used in. a quasi-criminal context, such as a forfeiture proceeding. E.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1885). Although the Supreme Court distinguished tax proceedings such as this from quasi-criminal proceedings for some purposes in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 , 58 S.Ct. 630 , 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938), more recent decisions illuminating the purpose and scope of the exclusionary rule indicate that the Court would extend the rule to “civil” suits of the kind instituted by the United States here. See, e. g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-531 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920).

. Cf. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 , 63 S.Ct. 1141 , 87 L.Ed. 1485 (1943); Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3, 8 (9th Cir. 1955); 2B W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1138 (Wright ed. 1961).

. The most nearly relevant findings of the district court read:

These findings contain no direct statement as to the purpose of the raids. They clearly do not exclude the possibility that one object of the raids was to obtain evidence for United States use.

. The following is a summary of a portion of this evidence. American interest in a possible tax ease against Stonehill antedated Spielman’s appearance by many years. Both before and after receiving Spielman’s information the local American tax agents were aware of the need for an investigation of Stonehill’s tax affairs but lacked the personnel to conduct it. Assistance was requested of Washington, but was not forthcoming. Chandler and FBI Agent Hawley took Spielman to the Philippine authorities. Chandler told the Philippine authorities that he thought there was an American tax case against Stonehill, but that the evidence had to be secured. Colonel Lukban told Chandler that if Spielman’s story checked out he would seek approval of an investigation by Philippine authorities. Chandler testified that in the course of meetings with Philippine authorities prior to the raids he made it clear that his interest was in appellant’s tax records as distinguished from those relating to bribery or political matters. When first told that the raids were contemplated, Chandler asked that they be postponed until he could obtain help from Washington. Later the raids were postponed for a week. A Philippine official testified that the reason for this postponement was that the people who were to come from the United States to help Chandler had not arrived. One of the American tax agents expected by Chandler arrived in this interval. Chandler and an FBI agent assisted in arranging a meeting in Hong Kong between the Philippine Secretary of Justice and the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. The contemplated raids were discussed at this meeting. Upon his return to Manila, the Secretary of Justice ordered the raids to proceed. The warrants issued by the Philippine magistrates referred to possible violation of internal revenue laws, but the Philippine Bureau of Revenue had no contact with the case before the raids. In the course of the raids Chandler and his associates were requested to, and did, select and segregate significant accounting records from the mass of documents found at one of the raided premises. At Chandler’s request, Colonel Lukban agreed in advance to make the seized documents available to the American agents, and in fact did so. The agents examined and copied documents over a period of about three months, initially in office space provided by the Philippine authorities.

. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 , 48 S.Ct. 137 , 72 L.Ed. 293 , 52 A.L.R. 1381 (1927) involved a search conducted solely to aid enforcement of a federal statute, but later decisions extended Gambino’s exclusionary rule to evidence seized by state officers in contemplation of possible federal use even though the state officers also contemplated use of the seized evidence in a state prosecution. Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477, 478-479 (8th Cir. 1942); Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305, 307-308 (4th Cir. 1937); Fowler v. United States, 62 F.2d 656, 657 (7th Cir. 1932). But see Kitt v. United States, 132 F.2d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1942).

Justice Frankfurter said in Elkins that the “question has always been whether the offending search or seizure was conducted in any part * * * in the interest of the Federal Government; or whether it was conducted * * * exclusively for state purposes.” 364 U.S. at 236 , 80 S.Ct. at 1455 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).

. See note 16.

. See text at note 18.

. See note 17.

. See note 17.

. See notes 19 and 20.