Following trial to the Court, sitting without a jury, a jury trial having been expressly waived, in writing, in the manner and form required by law, appellant, Leon Leonard Mizrahi, was convicted of having refused induction into the Armed Forces in violation of See. 12 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.App. § 462, and on the 29th day of November, 1967, was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of three years. He appeals, invoking the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 , 1294.

The appellant registered on May 22, 1956, while a high school student, with Local Board No. 118, Gardena, California. He was placed in Class I-A on June 3, 1956.

On June 10, 1957, the Local Board received the Classification Questionnaire (Form SS-100), in which no claim of conscientious objector was made.

Appellant remained classified as I-A until November 4, 1959, when he was reclassified in Class II-S (Student Deferment) because of his enrollment as an undergraduate at a university. Thereafter, and until September 9, 1964, appellant remained classified in II-S, during which period he completed his undergraduate work at the University, and graduated from the University of California School of Medicine.

On September 9, 1964, appellant was placed in Class II-A (Occupational Deferment), until July of 1965, during which period he completed his internship in medicine at the University of Kansas Medical Center.

On January 6, 1965, while appellant was completing his internship, appellant was placed in Class I-A. Appellant inquired of the Board why his classification had been changed to I-A, and whether his name had been selected for the April draft of physicians.

On March 10, 1965, the Board informed appellant that the change in his classification was due to the need for doctors in the Armed Forces, but that he would be allowed to complete his internship. Appellant was found acceptable for induction into the Armed Forces and on April 13, 1965, was ordered for induction on July 1, 1965.

On April 13, 1965, appellant was also notified by the Board advising him of his opportunity for a commission in the United States Navy.

• On April 26, 1965, the Board was informed by the United States Public Health Service that appellant had applied for a commission in that Service, and requested a statement as to his induction status.

On April 26, 1965, appellant was notified by Headquarters Fifth United States Army that he had been allocated for military service to the United States Navy and requested that he apply for a commission.

On April 26, 1965, the Local Board was informed by the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles that appellant had been accepted there as a resident doctor-in-training in pediatrics. On April 29, 1965, the Local Board was notified by the State Director of Selective Service to cancel appellant’s order for induction as a result of his residency training.

On August 4, 1965, appellant was placed in Class II-A (Occupational Deferment), until August 1966.

On October 7, 1965, appellant’s file was forwarded to the State Director for review. On that date the Board ordered appellant to report for pre-induction physical on October 23, 1965. On October 20, 1965, the file was returned to the Board with an accompanying letter reading:

On November 3, 1965, appellant was again ordered for physical examination on November 19,1965.

On January 24, 1966, the Local Board placed the appellant in Class I-A and notice of said classification was mailed to him.

On January 25, 1966, a statement of acceptability for service was mailed to appellant. On January 31, 1966, the Board received a letter from the appellant appealing his I-A classification. Appellant’s file was forwarded to the Appeal Board and on February 24, 1966, by a vote of 3-0, appellant was classified in Class I-A, and a notice of said classification was mailed appellant on that date.

On Monday, February 28, 1966, the Local Board mailed to appellant an order for induction on March 15,1966.

On the same Monday [February 28, 1966], the Board received a letter from appellant, dated Saturday, February 26, 1966, reading as follows:

The envelope containing the letter bears postal cancellation mark, Sunday, February 27, 1966. Conscientious objector form [SSS-150] was mailed to appellant by the Board on March 2, 1966, directing the completion and return of the same on or before March 8,1966.

On March 7, 1966, the Board received a letter from appellant protesting the in adequacy of the time allowed for completion of Form 150, objecting to the treatment of his claim “as a late request”, and asking that his induction notice be cancelled pending disposition of his conscientious objector claim.

On March 8, 1966, the Board received appellant’s completed special form for conscientious objector. Minutes of appellant’s Selective Service file reflect the following entry under date of March 10, 1966:

On March 11, 1966, the Local Board acknowledged receipt of appellant’s communication relative to his Selective Service status, and informed the appellant that the

On March 15, 1966, appellant reported to the induction station and thereafter refused induction into the Armed Forces as ordered by the Board on February 28, 1966. Thereafter appellant was indicted, convicted and sentenced, as heretofore stated.

Appellant was represented throughout the trial and on this appeal by retained counsel.

At the trial, the Government’s case consisted of the introduction of appellant’s Selective Service file which we have above summarized, and a written statement signed by appellant in the presence of a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Appellant’s case consisted of the testimony of appellant, and a Mrs. Armand, the Clerk of the Board, whose testimony clearly reflects that on March 10, following receipt of appellant’s completed conscientious objector form, she contacted two of the three members of the Board by telephone — the third member being unavailable — and polled them on the question of reopening, and that an actual face-to-face meeting of the members of the Board did not take place.

On this appeal, appellant makes no claim or contention that any error, procedural or substantive, occurred in his case prior to February 28,1966.

Appellant’s specification of errors is as follows:

We have concluded that the judgment must be reversed for the reason that appellant was denied due process when the Local Board refused to open and consider anew his classification upon his written request, timely filed with the Board.

The pertinent Selective Service Regulations [Title 32 C.F.R.] in relevant parts provide:

(a) that appellant’s written request to reopen, filed with the Local Board on Monday, February 28, 1966, was not timely filed under § 1625.2, because on the same day it mailed to registrant an Order to Report for Induction (SSS Form No. 252);

(b) that the new facts presented in such request to reopen did not justify a change in the appellant’s classification; and

(c) that appellant failed to report to the Local Board, in writing, within ten days after it occurred, as required by § 1625.1(b), the fact that he became a conscientious objector and that by such failure appellant, by reason of the provisions of § 1641.2(b), waived his right to request a reopening of his classification.

As related above, appellant’s letter requesting reopening was dated Saturday, February 26, 1966. The envelope containing the letter bore postal cancellation mark Sunday, February 27, 1966. The letter was received by the Local Board on Monday, February 28. The order of the Local Board directing appellant to report for induction was mailed Monday, February 28, 1966. Neither communication bears a time stamp showing the precise time of the day either document was received, or mailed, by the Local Board. Since appellant’s letter bears postal cancellation on Sunday, February 27, it is reasonable to assume that in the usual and ordinary-routine of business the letter was received by the Local Board on the first delivery of mail on Monday morning, February 28, and it is likewise reasonable to assume, for the same reason, that the Order of the Local Board dated February 28, was prepared and mailed during that day after the receipt of appellant’s letter. Any doubt on this subject should be resolved in favor of appellant.

In such letter appellant stated that he wished to claim status as a conscientious objector and be classified as I-O. He also requested Conscientious Objector Form SSS 150. The form was mailed to appellant on March 2, 1966. It was completed by him and received by the Local Board on March 8, 1966, which was after the mailing to appellant, on February 28, 1966, of the Order to Report for Induction. We regard the filing of the completed form simply as supplementary to appellant’s letter of February 26, 1966, requesting a reopening of his classification.

Local Board Memorandum No. 41, issued by the Director November 30, 1951, as amended July 30, 1968, deals with “Claims of Conscientious Objection.” In relevant part it provides:

Clearly, appellant’s letter of February 26, 1966, is a “written statement claiming that he [appellant] is a conscientious objector.”

Section 1621.11 states in relevant part:

In these circumstances it must be deemed that appellant’s written request stated his claim as a conscientious objector and was received by the Local Board before it mailed to appellant its Order to Report for Induction. Hence, appellant’s written request to reopen his classification was timely filed.

In its entry of March 10, 1966, the Local Board recognized that appellant, in his request for reopening, had furnished new information to that which already appeared in his file, but stated that reopening of his classification was not justified. It did not deal with the alleged facts as a question of whether this legally could provide basis for a reopening to be made, so as to entitle consideration and evaluation to be engaged in thereafter. As stated in the en banc decision in Petrie v. United States, 407 F.2d 267, 274 (9th Cir. 1969).

We have examined the new information furnished by appellant in support of his claim as a conscientious objector and we are satisfied that the appellant presented to the Local Board a prima facie case for placement in the I-0 classification, and that the Local Board erred in refusing to reopen. We find no basis in the record for the Government’s contention that appellant waived his right to request a reopening of his classification.

Reversed.