Irvin Rapoport v. Rose Rapoport, Also Known as Joan Sirott

416 F.2d 41 Irvin RAPOPORT, Appellant, v. Rose RAPOPORT, also known as Joan Sirott, Appellee. No. 23415. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. Aug. 20, 1969. Sheldon W. Farber, Norristown, Pa. (argued), and Robert Danforth, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. Louis M. Cohen (argued), of Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, Pa., Gordon W. Rice, Reno, Nev., Steinhart, Goldberg, Feigenbaum & Ladar, San Francisco, Cal., for appellee. Before KOELSCH and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judges, and HAUK, * District judge. HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge: 1 Irvin Rapoport ('Irvin') sued Rose Rapoport ('Rose') in the Federal District Court in Nevada seeking a declaration that Rose's Nevada divorce decree against him was void for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter and further seeking a declaration that an injunction issued by a Pennsylvania court restraining Rose from proceeding with her Nevada action was entitled to full faith and credit. The District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction and decided the case on the merits against Irvin. He appeals. 2 Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) (1). Because we hold that federal…

Irvin Rapoport (“Irvin”) sued Rose Rapoport (“Rose”) in the Federal District Court in Nevada seeking a declaration that Rose’s Nevada divorce decree against him was void for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter and further seeking a declaration that an injunction issued by a Pennsylvania court restraining Rose from proceeding with her Nevada action was entitled to full faith and credit. The District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction and decided the case on the merits against Irvin. He appeals.

Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (1). Because we hold that federal jurisdiction was lacking due to the absence of the requisite amount in controversy, we do not reach the merits of the litigation.

At all material times Irvin has been a resident of Pennsylvania, the state of the matrimonial domicile. In December 1963 Rose filed a divorce suit against Irvin. He answered, and the suit has been pending ever since. Rose left Pennsylvania for Nevada in the spring of 1964. In May 1964 she commenced a divorce suit in Nevada. Irvin was not personally served in Nevada, and he never appeared in the Nevada courts. When he was constructively…

(dissenting).

I dissent.

As a tenant by the entireties in fee in the Rapoport real property, Irvin’s interest is of the whole worth at least $25,000 [Walker’s Estate, 340 Pa. 13 , 16 A.2d 28 , 132 A.L.R. 628 (1940) ; C.I.T. Corp. v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350 , 5 A.2d 126 , 121 A.L.R. 1022 (1939)]; as a tenant in common his interest is but half with a correspondingly lesser value. Manifestly the difference adequately meets the monetary requirement of the diversity statute.

“And I submit that the suit directly involves the property, for the true nature of the parties’ present interests necessarily hinges upon the outcome. The appeal should be entertained.