Robert S. London v. Standard Oil Company of California, Inc.

Robert S. London commenced this action on April 6, 1965 against Standard Oil Company of California, Inc. (Standard), in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Division. He sought damages in the sum of $700,000, alleging that the crash landing of his Piper Supercub airplane, as described below, was caused by defendant’s negligence or breach of warranty in supplying automotive gasoline, instead of aviation gasoline, for his airplane. Standard removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska upon the ground of diversity of citizenship.

After a lengthy trial the jury returned a verdict for Standard and judgment was entered thereon. London appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to give a requested instruction and in ad *822 mitting, over plaintiff’s objection, a certain line of testimony.

At the oral argument in this court inquiry was made from the bench as to whether the allegations of the complaint and the petition for removal were sufficient to show that the district court had diversity jurisdiction and, if not, whether the petition for removal was susceptible of amendment in this court to overcome any deficiency.

The…

417 F.2d 820 Robert S. LONDON, Appellant, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, INC., Appellee. No. 22892. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. November 4, 1969. Donald Burr (argued) of Burr, Boney & Pease, Anchorage, Alaska, for appellant. James Delaney (argued) of Delaney, Wiles, Moore & Hayes, Anchorage, Alaska, for appellee. Before HAMLEY and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, and BYRNE, District Judge. * HAMLEY, Circuit Judge: 1 Robert S. London commenced this action on April 6, 1965 against Standard Oil Company of California, Inc. (Standard), in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Division. He sought damages in the sum of $700,000, alleging that the crash landing of his Piper Supercub airplane, as described below, was caused by defendant's negligence or breach of warranty in supplying automotive gasoline, instead of aviation gasoline, for his airplane. Standard removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska upon the ground of diversity of citizenship. 2 After a lengthy trial the jury returned a verdict for Standard and judgment was entered thereon. London appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to give a…

(dissenting):

I respectfully dissent.

An allegation that an individual is a citizen of a certain state is an allegation of fact. However, a corporation is a creature of statute and its citizenship can be established only by compliance with the statutes. It follows that an allegation that a corporation is a citizen of a certain state is not an allegation of fact, but a mere conclusion of law. For the purpose of .federal jurisdiction, “a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business”. ( 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c))

“The prerequisites to the exercise of jurisdiction are specifically defined * * *. They are conditions which must be met by the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor. He must allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction. If he fails to make the necessary allegations he has no standing.” McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 , 56 S.Ct. 780, 785 , 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1935). (emphasis added)

In its petition for removal of this state court litigation to the federal District Court, Standard Oil stated plaintiff was a citizen…