United States v. Edwin Affron Kartman

Defendant, a ministry student, went to the Armed Forces Induction Center in Oakland, California, on December 18, 1967, to “lend * * * moral support” to demonstrators protesting the Selective Service System and this country’s participation in the Vietnam conflict. In the course of the demonstration, defendant kicked Richard M. St.Germain, a deputy marshal of the United States, who, with another federal officer, was engaged in subduing and arresting a demonstrator. Defendant was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 . 1 He was convicted, and appealed. We have concluded that several errors and defects in the proceedings, considered cumulatively, may have affected defendant’s substantial rights. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

The indictment alleged that defendant assaulted Deputy Marshal St.Germain “knowing him to be such officer.” The trial court, holding that the quoted language was surplusage, declined to instruct the jury that the government must prove that the defendant knew Mr. St.Germain to be a deputy marshal.

The court’s ruling was correct. Knowledge of the official status of the victim of a forcible assault is not an element of that offense under 18…

(dissenting):

I must respectfully dissent.

This is an unusual case. A divinity student is charged with assaulting a deputy U. S. Marshal. He admits kicking the Marshal. His defense was twofold. First he claimed he did not know the person kicked was a U. S. Marshal. This was resolved against him by the trial court and by the majority here in its correct holding that knowledge of the official status of the victim of the assault is not an element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 111 .

Second, his factual defense was that he went to the aid of a person he believed was being assaulted. He received complete and favorable instructions to the jury on this issue and they found him guilty.

The majority was compelled to hold that official status of the victim was not an element of the offense by our decision in McEwen v. United States, 390 F.2d 47 . They now reach for other grounds to reverse the conviction. The majority opinion bases its reversal on two supposed errors which cumulatively, it is said, require reversal.

I.

The first error found was the rejection of the offer of proof of instructions to the United States Marshals not to arrest in certain Selective Service cases. 1 The…

417 F.2d 893 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edwin Affron KARTMAN, Defendant-Appellant. No. 22984. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. October 9, 1969. Aubrey Grossman (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. Jerrold M. Ladar (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Cecil F. Poole, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee. Before BROWNING, CARTER and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judges. BROWNING, Circuit Judge: 1 Defendant, a ministry student, went to the Armed Forces Induction Center in Oakland, California, on December 18, 1967, to "lend * * * moral support" to demonstrators protesting the Selective Service System and this country's participation in the Vietnam conflict. In the course of the demonstration, defendant kicked Richard M. St.Germain, a deputy marshal of the United States, who, with another federal officer, was engaged in subduing and arresting a demonstrator. Defendant was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 . 1 He was convicted, and appealed. We have concluded that several errors and defects in the proceedings, considered cumulatively, may have affected defendant's substantial rights. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. 2…